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NOTE
NYSE RULES AND THE ANTITRUST LAWSRULE 394 -

NECESSARY RESTRICTION

OR ILLEGAL REFUSAL TO DEAL?
INTRODUCTION

From the year 1820, when the real history of the New York Stock
Exchange may be said to have commenced, it has gone on steadily
increasing in its members, power, and influence until today it can
be safely affirmed to be the most powerful organization of the kind
in the world.'
As evidenced by the above statement, the hegemonic posture of
the New York Stock Exchange was already well established in the
latter part of the nineteenth century. The last ninety years have by
no means demonstrated any diminution in this position. In fact, its
dominance in the securities markets has finally prompted recent inquiries into the possible illegality of sundry measures utilized by the
Exchange to perpetuate its supereminence in the industry.
Nevertheless, nowhere in its history has the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) confronted the issues it faces today. Its position as
the leading marketplace for securities is presently being challenged.
This is due to a great extent to the increased utilization of alternative'
markets for securities which are providing more competitive prices,
an element especially attractive to the increasingly potent institutional
investors who have in recent years made a substantial impact on the
industry as a whole.2 The inability of the Exchange to successfully
preempt the trading of block transactions is essentially the result of
its unmindful adherence to anti-competitive practices. Fixed commissions and restrictive trading rules, which ironically were instituted to
shield the Exchange from competition, now appear to have damaging

I J.R.

Dos PAssos, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF STocK-BROKERS AND STOCK EXCHANGES 10

(1882).
2 See N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1970, at 41, col. 1, referring to a recent speech by Robert
Haack, President of the, NYSE, in which he warns that the Exchange must become more
competitive in order to halt the shift of trading away from the Exchange and into the
third market and regional exchanges. No doubt, the fourth market could also be
included in this list of competitors. The Exchange is losing a great deal of business. As
the editorial points out: "The shift of trading away from the Big Board is accelerating;
an estimated 35 to 45 percent of block trades, involving 10,000 shares or more, are now
conducted in other markets." But see STUDY OF THE FRAGMENTATION OF THE CENTRAL
MARKET, BNA, 88 SEC. REG. & L. REP. J-1 (Feb. 10, 1971) which concludes to the con-

trary that the NYSE has increased its share of the market.
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effects on its market position. 3 It seems inevitable that if the NYSE is
to continue as the dominant securities market it is going to have to
yield to these competitive pressures and modernize its trading practices.

First among its priorities is the necessity for the implementation of a
negotiated system of commission rates to augment the present fixed
commission system. In addition to submitting to competition concerning its rates, the Exchange must also meet a challenge to its

policies restricting its members trading practices off the floor of the
Exchange and those towards non-members access to its facilities. Be-

cause of their ability to compete, third market firms desire the opportunity to trade with Exchange members. Indeed, some third market
dealers assert that the New York Stock Exchange must yield to this
type of open competition if it is to remain a viable force in the indus-

try 4 Underlying these claims are significant legal issues. Specifically
3 The avowed objectives of organizing the NYSE in 1792 were the setting of
minimum commission rates and the establishment of a preference for members of
the Exchange in their dealings with other members and were stated as follows:
We, the Subscribers, Brokers for the Purchase and Sale of Public Stock, do
hereby solemnly promise and pledge ourselves to each other, that we will
not buy or sell from this day for any person whatsoever, any kind of Public
Stock at a less rate than one-quarter percent commission on the Specie value,
and that we will give a preference to each other in our Negotiations. In Testimony whereof we have set our hands this 17th day of May, at New York, 1792.
SEC, REPORT OF THE SPEciAL STUDY OF THz Scuaprs L ,rs,
H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. at 295 (1963), citing EmsS, Tr Naw YoRK STocm EXcHANGE 14 (1894)
[hereinafter SPECAL STUDY].
4 See BNA, 76 Sac. REG. L. REP. at A-4 (Nov. 11. 1970) (speech by Donald Weeden of
Weeden & Co.). A recent chairman of the SEC has specifically recognized the need to
revise some industry practices:
It's clear that we are going to have new commission rates, new rules on access to
exchanges, new relationships between institutions, new technologies and new
competitive forces.
...
If we can get these interrelationships satisfactorily resolved we should have
a healthy capital machinery and well served investors.
Address by Win. J. Casey, Chairman of SEC on the Public Interest in Our Securities
Markets, BNA, 107 SEC. REP. & L. REP. D-1 (June 23, 1971). Recently a class action was
filed alleging that rule 394, precluding members from trading with non members in
listed issues, was violative of the Sherman Act. Dubbed an illegal monopolist, the Exchange is charged with effectively stifling competition in the investment industry. See
BNA, 98 Sac. REG. & L. RP. A-3 (Apr. 21, 1971). In answer to an SEC directive to the Exchange to develop a plan "for reasonable non-member access" to Exchange facilities (SEC
Securities Act Release No. 8328 (Oct. 22, 1970)), the NYSE, on June 30, 1971, submitted its plan of reasonable access to the Exchange by non-member broker-dealers. The
proposal basically calls for a 30% discount from the minimum commission rates charged
non-members. All broker-dealers who are primarily transacting business as a broker or
dealer in securities and, who can demonstrate compliance to the Constitution and Rules
of the Exchange, are seemingly eligible for the discount. Lest the discounting might have
undesirable consequences since there is, according to the NYSE, much uncertainty as to
the effects of this "accessibility" on the securities markets as a whole, the Exchange

proposes a one year trial period to examine the new discounting in operation. Included
in the proposal is a recommendation by the Exchange that the non-member dealers be
directed by the SEC (by its rule-making power) to charge the NYSE rate to their
customers despite their 50% savings on commissions. The Exchange based this recom-
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the restrictions on off-board trading imposed by the Exchange on its
members generate genuine controversies involving a balancing of
competition and government regulation.
Inquiry into the possible extension of the antitrust laws to the
securities markets is of recent origin. 5 Varied, interrelated antitrust
claims have been asserted involving substantial questions of law, public
policy and economics.0 The following analysis, however, is limited to
the antitrust ramifications of NYSE rule 394 which precludes Exchange
members, except in limited instances, from seeking better executions
for their customers in listed securities off the floor of the Exchange.
The objective of this paper is to examine the rule against the background of antitrust principles and the broad purposes of the Exchange
Act amid conflicting policy considerations concerning preservation of
competition and self-regulation in the securities industry. Whether or
not such a rule is a necessary concomitant of NYSE self-regulation will
ultimately turn on the further question of whether or not such a
7
rule is necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work.
mendation on the possibility that an abusive degree of rebating would result from the
discounts allowed. See NYSE Report on New Minimum Commission Rate Schedule,
BNA, 108 SEc. REP. & L. REP. E-1 to E-10 (June 30, 1971).
It is clear that third market firms would gain no advantage from this plan. The
precise reason which has enabled the third market to flourish has been their ability to
trade NYSE securities at negotiated rates, below the fixed Exchange level. If they are
given the discount but then forced to refrain from passing any of the savings to their
customers their position is not enhanced.
5 Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963); see also Asch, Antitrust
Laws and The Regulated Securities Markets, 11 ANTrrRUST BULL. 209 (1966); Jennings,
New York Stock Exchange and the Commission Rate Struggle, 21 Bus. LAW. 159 (1965);
Bicks, Antitrust and the New York Stock Exchange, 21 Bus. LAw. 129 (1965); Note,
Antitrust and the Securities Industry: Lessons From the Ship Building Industry, 55
CoRmELL L. REv. 96 (1969); Note, The Minimum Commission System and the New York
Stock Exchange, 38 FoRDHAr L. REv. 84 (1969); An Antitrust Challenge to the Minimum
Commission Rates on the New York Stock Exchange, 45 N.C.L. REv. 301 (1966); Baxter,
New York Stock Exchange Fixed Commission Rates: A Private Cartel Goes Public, 22
STAN. L. REv. 675 (1970); Comment, Antitrust and the Stock Exchange: Minimum Commission or Free Competition?, 18 STAN. L. REv. 213 (1965); Johnson, Application of
Antitrust Laws to the Securities Industry, 20 Sw. L.J. 536 (1966); Sterling, Stockbrokers
Going Public: Antitrust Aspects of Exchange Rules, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 563 (1966); Note,
The New York Stock Exchange Minimum Commission Rate Structure: Antitrust on Wall
Street, 55 VA. L. REv. 661 (1969); Nerenberg, Applicability of the Antitrust Laws to the
from AntiSecurities Field, 16 W. Rxs. L. REv. 131 (1964); Note, Monopolies-Immunity
trust Liability -Minimum Commission Rates of Stock Exchanges, 19 W. REs. L. REv. 167
(1967). See also 5 L. Loss, SacusTs REGULATION 3153-85 (Supp. 1969) [hereinafter Loss].
6 See Bicks, Antitrust and the New York Stock Exchange, 21 Bus. LAw. 129, 145 (1965);
recently antitrust challenges have arisen concerning the public ownership proposals of
the New York Stock Exchange, see BNA, 25 SEC. REG. & L. REP. X-37 (Nov. 19, 1969)
(comments by Antitrust Division on NYSE public ownership proposals); BNA, 71 id. A-3
(Oct. 7, 1970) wherein it is reported that a class action has been instituted on behalf of all
stockholders who trade on the exchanges against the NYSE for damages totaling $3 billion
resulting it is alleged, from the Exchange's minimum fee structure.
7 See generally Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
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THE THIRD MARKET

An analysis of rule 894 and its pendent problems necessitates an
understanding of the setting in which the rule operates." A thorough
examination of the third market is inextricably part of that setting for
it is the firms comprising this market as well as member-firms of the
NYSE which the rule ultimately affects. Interrelationships between
the NYSE and the third market must be explored. Differences and
peculiarities must be segregated and the economic and competitive
significance of this rival market must be examined. Such a background
is necessary, if further discussion of the problems created by the rule
is to be meaningful.
Complexion and Growth of the Third Market
The third market is in many ways a peculiar animal. While it
possesses characteristics of both the auction (e.g., NYSE) markets and
the over-the-counter markets it retains its individuality by performing
its own unique functions. "In methods and structure this market is
part of the larger over-the-counter market. But its prices are necessarily related to those on the exchanges. It is this unique ambivalence
that has produced the fitting designation, third market."9 Simply, the
third market is nothing more than a market away from the floor of
the exchanges, for securities traded on the exchanges. 10
8See generally SPECIAL STUDY 870-911, 952-61 (much of the material in this section

has been extracted from this portion of the SPECIAL STUDY); Loss 3343-47; Polakoff &
Sametz, The Third Market-The Nature of Competition in the Market for Listed
Securities Traded Off-Board, 11 Ar'rrrusT BULL. 191 (1966); Schlesinger, The Third
Market- Challenge to the New York Stock Exchange, 20 Sw. L.J. 640 (1966); Thomas,

Unorganized Exchange, BARRON's, Aug. 8, 1966, at 3, Aug. 15, 1966, at 9; Weeden, The
Third Market, DuKEa CONFERENCE ON SECURrrIEs REGULATION (Mundheim ed. 1964); see
also The Rising Fourth Market, TIME, Oct. 26, 1970, at 110.

Within the last few years, still another specialized market for securities has evolved,
namely the "Fourth Market." Individuals there arrange direct trades between institutions. The system often involves a three-way telephone conversation between the individual, the seller and buyer. It is termed the "fourth market" because it "bypasses the
three more conventional methods of trading securities: the exchanges, the over-the-counter
market and the market for listed stocks created by brokers who are not members of the
exchange." It offers two advantages to those who trade there. First, all trading is secret.
This prevents sharp fluctuations in price which occur when rumors of a large offering
permeate the financial scene. Secondly, the institutions can avoid the large commission
rates that the exchanges charge. One such individual, Tomasco Associates, a Chicagobased firm charges 25 cents per share up to a maximum of $10,000 per year. Thus, a client
pays nothing above this amount. By comparison, sales of 40,000 shares of a $50 stock costs
$11,360 on the NYSE. The writer points out that the rise of such a market provides more
evidence of the need to reconsider the role of the primary auction market in light of
increased institutional participation. The NYSE seems to be threatened by the third and
fourth markets only because these markets are providing economic incentives (cost savings) to investors to bring their business away from the Exchange. Id.
9 Loss 3345.

10 Throughout its entirety, this paper will be concerned only with the market for
NYSE listed securities traded off-board, since rule 394 is a NYSE rule and since the third
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The growth of this market has been phenomenal in recent years.
Its dollar volume surged from 84 million dollars in 1941 to 2 billion
dollars in 1961,11 and later in 1965 to 2.5 billion dollars.'2 There is
present in the third market a high degree of professional participation.
This is illustrated by the fact that "the estimated value of sales by the
public in the third market amounted to only 2 to 2V percent of such
sales on the Exchange."' 3 In addition to increases in dollar volume
there has been substantial growth in the number of firms actively
making a market in NYSE-listed shares. Since 1950, 14 of the 17 firms
now existing have entered the stream of third market business.' 4 In
1940 there were only 5 such firms. These statistics are even more
impressive when considered jointly with the fact that firms, involved in
third market operations, have been constantly increasing the number
of issues in which they make a market. 15
In 1941, a Commission Staff Study disclosed that the type of
listed stocks traded off the board were of the high quality and inactive
type such as shares of real estate, utilities and financial groups. However, there has been a dramatic change since then. Today, the spectrum
of shares traded includes "Blue Chips" and less seasoned stocks as well,
and "some of the 270 NYSE common stocks traded in the third market
are among the most active on the Exchange."' 16
Transactions in the third market, to a much greater extent than
on the Exchange, tend to extremes - either they are very large or very
small. Indeed, the larger institutional block transactions have always
been immediately identifiable with this market as one of its main areas
of concern.' 7
market is overwhelmingly a NYSE third market. In 1962, 85 percent of the stocks traded
in the third market were NYSE listings. SPECIL STUDY 870.
The Special Study underscored the significance of this market by stating: "The very
existence of such trading prompts inquiry into the basis for a market which appears to
duplicate the function of the exchanges, and into its particular structure and operation
and impact upon the primary market." SPEciAL STUDY 871.
11 SPEcIAL STUDY 870.
12 Schlesinger, supra note 8, at 690 n.3, citing SEC STATISTcAL BULL., March 1966
at 10.
13 SPEcLAL STUDY 873.
14 Id. 874.
15 Id.
16 Id. 875. The Special Study sampled one day's trading to elicit still another
dimension of growth. In 1962, the over-the-counter purchases and sales of all Exchange
stocks amounted to 26.9 million dollars or 6.3 percent, of the total estimated trading
(429.4 million dollars) on the Exchanges that day.
17d. 878, citing Is the Stock Market Obsolete, FORTUNE, Feb. 1954, 129, 158. One
market-maker related to the commission the policy considerations involved in choosing
to deal in a particular security:
The policy of the firm is to add a security to our trading list only if it is felt
that the security has a sufficiently broad and continuous investor interest to
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Why such a market should develop seems to be answered by this
statement by the Special Study:
The reason for the existence of an over-the-counter market in
listed stocks-in the face of a highly organized, established exchange market in which the same securities are traded-would
appear to lie in its capacity to satisfy needs not met by the exchange market.' 8
Customers of the Third Market
The third market, in the main, services large institutional investors and "other public customers" besides individuals. 19 Pension funds,
insurance companies and common trust funds typify the customers
with whom third market firms deal.20 Approximately two thirds of
the institutional business is transacted on a principal basis through
market-makers and one-third by broker-dealers as agents. "Much of
the latter consist of transactions in which the broker-dealer brings
together an institution desiring to sell (or buy) with another institution
wishing to buy (or sell) the same security, in what may be termed an
21
off-board cross."
In addition to the institutional trade, professional intermediaries
are also active as customers on the third market. These individuals
trade in a representative capacity for public customers but are not
market-makers for their own accounts.2 2 The third market is attractive
to these professional intermediaries basically for economic reasons.
Because they are not members of the NYSE they must pay the full
commission rate if they trade on that exchange. This leaves no room
justify it being traded on a permanent basis. The issue must also be of a
type in which we feel we will be able to maintain a competitive net market.
Taken into consideration are the number of institutional investors holding
the security in portfolio, as well as the nature and frequency of inquiries for the
security by our customers. Also considered are the number of shares outstanding,
daly volume, post market action, and price level.
Id. 877.
18 Id. 879. Trading on the third market is inviting for several reasons. One is the

retention of control over his order which a customer enjoys. Negotiation of price is
directly with the market-maker and the institution usually has the opportunity to shop
around if more than one market-maker is trading in the stock. In addition, there is
always the NYSE if prospects on the third market are not attractive.
19 Id. 879.
20 Id. 880-82. Many individuals deal in the third market too. In 1962, their trading

represented 38 percent of the dollar volume and 68 percent of the share volume in the
third market. This corresponds to the high percentage of odd lot sales that took place
on the third market since it is safe to assume that odd lot transactions are predominantly
individual transactions. Id. 881-82.
21 Id. 880-82.
22 Id.

883. See id. for a discussion of this transaction.
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to charge for its own services. 23 Thus, since a substantial number of
these professionals are not members of an exchange, the third market
offers the only economically feasible market in which they can trade.
The third category of customer in the third market is the marketmaker. The market-maker's competitive position vis-4-vis the Exchange
specialist is one of the primary reasons for rule 394's existence. The
third type of customer is defined as
broker-dealers actively engaged as principals in buying and selling
NYSE-listed securities over the counter on a continuous basis and
holding themselves out to institutions and other broker-dealers as
making markets in such listed securities.2 4
The market-makers rank in size from modest organizations to some of
the largest securities firms in the industry. Their trade is almost exclusively with institutions and broker-dealers. "Since institutions trade
largely through skilled trading departments, the market is almost
25
exclusively a professional one."
Firms holding themselves out as market-makers stress trading,
while omitting various services normally offered by the public commission houses on the Exchange.2 6 Business is strictly on a cash and
carry basis. There are no research services and investment advice is
27
not for sale among third market brokers.
Prices quoted on the NYSE are significant to the market-makers
who keep fully informed of the movements on the Exchange by
subscribing to the NYSE ticker service. In addition, many of the market-makers have direct wire connection to the Exchange members at
the same time maintaining elaborate communication systems among
themselves.
Third Market Operations
Generally, the price on the third market rarely deviates from the
28
NYSE price by greater than the amount of the Exchange commission.
23 Id. 884. This has led to the creation of various reciprocal arrangements such as
customer-directed give-ups which were ultimately prohibited by the Exchange in 1968.
24 Id. 885. The Special Study recommended the establishment of methods to identify
third market-makers and to provide for the reporting of their market activity so as to
keep the SEC fully aware of the problems that might ensue. The result was the promulgation of SEC rule 17 (a) 9 effective 1965. See Loss 3346-47 for a complete analysis of
these reporting requirements.
25Id. 886 (footnotes omitted). Certain evidence substantiates this point. The merchandising techniques utilized by market-makers are aimed specifically to attract professional customers. A majority of these makers advertise their markets by maintaining
bids and offers in the sheets of NQB. Other firms utilize circulars or trading cards which
are mailed exclusively to institutions.
26 Id. 887.
27 Schlesinger, supra note 8, at 641.
28 SpEC.L STUDY 888.
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However, this relationship is not a mechanical one. The marketmakers have diverse trading practices which dictate their policy of
29
pricing in their markets.

Pricing principles, however, differ according to the particular type
of trade being transacted. While odd-lot prices are comparable to
NYSE's prices, price is the sole factor in small round-lot transactions,
the consideration of depth being insignificant in such a trade.3° Of
course, if the market-maker does not remain competitive with the
Exchange, the broker-dealers will direct their business to the auction
market. In these smaller transactions, there is less room for negotiation
and, since the market-makers desire to deal at their quotation, 31 they
are reluctant to negotiate.
Important to an understanding of trading in the smaller
round-lot transaction on the third market is an awareness of the
different bases upon which institutions and broker-dealer intermediaries trade with the market-maker. The institution trades
directly for its own account as principal. This means that it is
generally interested only in the comparative net cost or proceeds of
29

See id. 888-97. One large diversified market-maker described his pricing practices

as follows:
The pricing of a stock or making of a market at any given moment involves a
combination of factors. Those factors include the firm's current inventory
position, the trader's attitude toward the market, the nature of the inquiry, and
other inquiries received in that specific security. After all those considerations,
there must be added the desire and the willingness to be competitive. Normally,
we try to maintain a sA- or 1/2-point spread between bid and offer price with a
minimum of 100 shares bid and offered. In the process of being competitive the
following factors are considered:
The last public transaction price as reported on the NYSE ticker tape.
The bid and asked quotations as provided by the facilities of the NYSE.
The off-board market being made in competition to our market.
Id. 889.
The Special Study summarized the pricing policies of the market-makers as being a
[C]ombination of a realistically narrow spread between the quotes and a balanced
straddle, in which the last price on the Exchange falls halfway between the
market-maker's quotations, .
Id.
Of course, the off-board market available to customers at the time of inquiry is
comprised of the best bid and offer in all markets for the stock being made. See Id. 890.
Another market-maker added these considerations as influencing his pricing practices:
I. Last sale on the NYSE.
2. Current bid and asked quotations.
3. Range for the day.
4. Size of the block may make it desirable for the buyer and seller to agree
mutually upon price.
5. Our judgment as to the relative value of the security involved.
Id.
30 Id. 890-91. The competition is rigorous for the market-makers. They are transacting with professionals who not only have access to the latest price information in addition
to the last exchange price and the current quotations but also quotations of other marketmakers dealing in the same stock. Id. 891.
31 Negotiations away from the quotes serve only to narrow their spread.
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the transaction, the price paid or received on the Exchange, plus
or minus commissions. Thus, the institution may find it worthwhile to trade off board where the price is inferior to the price on
the Exchange but better than the total of price and Exchange commission.32
In large round-lot transactions the added dimension of depth of
the market becomes relevant, 38 in addition to price and cost con-

siderations. Of these large round-lot trades, block transactions of
institutions present "the most important and intricate aspects of

pricing and trading mechanics on the third market." 34 One characteristic of market-makers who specialize in institutional trades is their

ability to turn their inventories over rapidly and maintain the large
position required. 35
An examination of the differences between the auction markets
and the over-the-counter markets will illustrate why institutional customers, who are free to transact business in either market, may utilize
one rather than the other. However, in such an examination it is
dangerous to "overstress the bounds of competition." 36
Id. 892 (emphasis added).
Depth is an important concept to the institutional trader. The term refers to the
quantity of buying or selling interest in a stock at particular price levels.
34 Id. 983. Some generalizations can be made about market-maker activity in large
size transactions. The larger the deal:
(1) the more negotiation is going to play a significant role.
(2) the greater is the deviation from the last price on the Exchange likely to be.
(3) the more likely the market-maker will handle it on an agency basis and not
for his own account.
However, the fact remains that the more the market-maker learns of his
customer needs, the more likely he will assume the risk in dealing for his own
account, and the greater the expectation of his customer that the market-maker
will not compete with the customer for any stock but rather will show it to him
before offering it to another customer.
Id. 894.
35 This ability to take a heavy position, or to negotiate a large deal on an agency
basis, undoubtedly constitutes the single attribute of the market-maker's most
important to their institonal [sic] customers.
Id. 894-95.
36 Id. 895.
Block transactions are often programmed out, on a dollar-cost-averaging or
equivalent basis, over a period of time, regardless of whether handled entirely on
one market or the other, or both. The markets are likely to be complementary
in executing the block as a whole, even though competitive for the individual
trades making up the block program. In this respect, the inherent attributes of
each market -the
auction market of the Exchange and the negotiated off-board
market-may suggest differences in method of operation. Thus, while the comparison here is made of the execution of transactions of depth on each market,
the choice in any specific case may be between such a transaction on the third
market and a larger number of smaller sized transactions on the Exchange. The
skilled institutional trader, interested in securing the best average net price for
the entire transaction, utilizes the best of each market throughout each trading
situation, which is continuously changing to reflect the impact of a variety of
forces.
Id.
In addition, whether or not an institution deals with the specialist is to some degree
influenced by the awareness of the specialist's power to influence prices on all markets.
32
33
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The primary difference between the third market and the exchange markets is illustrated by consideration of the role of the specialist on the Exchange, in which he performs two important functions:
one as a broker, to hold and execute orders for the public, and that of
a dealer, to make a market and trade for his own account. Because of
his position, the specialist possesses intimate knowledge of the market
for securities. This is made possible by his book and his central
position on the trading floor. In contrast, the market-maker relies only
on the Exchange tape and quotations as a basis for his trading. The
specialist, however, is restricted to some degree in his trading activities,
i.e., in his agency versus dealer functions.37
The differences in market structure to a large degree explain the
differences in the trading operations. In the third market an institutional customer in most cases deals directly with the market-maker.
Theoretically, the same customer could also trade directly with the
specialist, but such is not the practice. In either case, however, the
institutional customer would pay the full commission.38
Preferences over the Exchange Market
While considerations such as price, cost and depth of the market
are all submitted as factors determining market choice, all of these
reasons seem bound up in one predominant objective, that is, "the
institution's objective of realizing the best possible net cost or proceeds
39
in each transaction."
Institutional trading on the Exchange is subject to the fixed commission rate schedule; 40 in contrast, when dealing as principals in the
third market they pay (or receive) a price net of commissions which is
"Failure to make a deal with a market-maker, over-the-counter presumably does not.
prejudice the institution's opportunity to deal advantageously elsewhere." Id.
The specialist, however, occupies a key position affecting all markets on which
the security is traded. His knowledge of large interest on either side of the
market, evidenced by a substantial order overhanging the market or by continuous dealing by a single broker or even a group of brokers, may in itself lead
to an adjustment of quotations to anticipate the effect of that interest on the
market.
Id.

The result is something approaching a clandestine attitude when institutions are

dealing with the specialist on the Exchange as opposed to their dealings in the third
market.
37 Id. 896.
38 The significant difference is that in the one case the institution, which often

possesses a skilled trading department, deals directly with the market makers;
in the other, it negotiates through an intermediary.
Id. 896.
39 Id. 897.
40 In 1968 the Exchange implemented moderate volume discounts on trades over
1000 shares to enhance its competitive position vis-A-vis alternative markets for its listed

securities. See Fredman & Johnson, Effect of New NYSE Fee Structure on the Third Mar-

ket, FIN. Exac., Oct. 1970, at 18. The authors contend commission savings are not the sole
motivation for third market activity, citing other important factors such as depth, speed
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set by a market-maker who regulates his markups, making it as low
or as high as he wishes, in light of all pertinent considerations. 41
Depth of the Market
In this context, the concept of negotiating transactions of depth
refers to the quantity of buying or selling interest in a stock at particular price levels.4 Since the third market reflects a form of multiple
trading, it is a competitive market and as such seems to divert trading
from the Exchange's market. It, therefore, affects the depth of the
auction market.
The important factor to consider is not that there is diversion but
rather the effect of this diversion. Most of the issues traded on the
third market enjoy substantial trading activity on the NYSE. In addidon, of the 270 stocks traded in the third market, diversion by offboard volume tended to be low, exceeding 10 percent of the Exchange
volume in the case of only 21 of 207 stocks which were actively traded
on NYSE. 43 With respect to the depth factor, the Special Study con-

cluded that "[The] third market, whatever its effect on the depth of
the primary market, provides the public customer with overall markets
of greater depth." This is primarily due to the fact that the institution
is given an alternative market in which to trade in the event that the
in transactions and secrecy in dealings. They conclude that there was no significant
decline in third market trading after the implementation of the volume discounts.
41 SPECIAL STUDY 897.
To simplify grossly for purposes of illustration, in a 10,000-share purchase of
a $40 stock, the institution's total cost on the Exchange is $403,900; 400,000
being the price of the shares and $3,900 commission. A market-maker on the
third market with a share cost of $40 may quote less than $403,900 on a principal
basis by a markup of less than $3,900. Conceivably, with a share cost of 401/, or
even 40V, he can produce a total customer cost less than the Exchange total
by settling for a lower markup.
Id.
42 SPECAL STUmy 898. The importance of this concept can readily be seen by considering block transactions. In such trading it is very difficult to ascertain whether buying
interest will be maintained at the current quoted price. That is, the last round lot for
a particular large sale may have to be traded at a lower price than the first. Another
consideration is the impact on price the offering of such a large block will have on the
price itself. Thus, the block transaction on the Exchange is riddled with uncertainty.
However, in the third market this element is missing. A market-maker can quote a fixed
net price for all or part of an order. He may even assume a short position if his inventories are shallow. Schlesinger, supra note 8, at 643.
43 SPECIAL STUDY 902. The Special Study considered the fact that although the
percentage of off-board trading has increased relative to NYSE volume, the Exchange
volume has grown substantially over the last fifteen years in shares traded on both
markets to a much greater extent than before trading of those issues began on the
third market.
It is also interesting to note that the Exchange's share volume in the stocks traded
by one of the largest market-makers increased 16.5 percent from 1961 to 1962 in the
face of substantial growth in the market-maker's volume and a 5.8 percent decline in
the Exchange's total share volume. Id. 902 (footnote omitted).
441d. 903 (emphasis added).
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specialist cannot handle the order or bring it to the Exchange without
substantially affecting the price. 45 The market-maker is thus likened to
a "quasi-specialist" or "auxiliary specialist" and adds overall depth to
the markets available to the institutional investors. 4 Although the
third market represents a competitor to the NYSE, the market is more
accurately viewed as complementary to the auction market, at least
47
insofar as the institutional investor is concerned.
One additional reason why the third market may enhance the
depth of the market is the notion that in the case of large transactions if
they were to be fragmented into many smaller trades and disposed on
the NYSE over a period of time, it would very likely create an imbalance of demand and supply rather than contributing to any sort of
48
balance of these two variables.
Competition with the Exchange
While there is little price competition in odd-lot sales between
the two markets, the competition in the institutional business is intense. Institutional customers usually measure price and depth in the
third market against price and depth on the Exchange. In addition,
services that are included in the fixed commission rate, are useless to
institutional customers who, as professional investors, are fully
equipped with their own investment counseling. The third market
enables these professionls, not being members of any exchange, to
do business with them in listed securities without any fixed commission
rate. As mentioned earlier, it also becomes extremely attractive to a
non-member, broker-dealer who is not making a market himself. If
he were to trade in listed securities on the Exchange, he would have
to pay full commission rate. He is then forced to transfer these shares
to his customer at zero profit. Many times, this is done to maintain
important customers. Hence, the third market becomes profitable for
him to trade in listed securities since the commissions are negotiable.
The public benefits also because now the nonmember broker-dealer is
able to offer a more complete selection of stocks than would be possible were it not for the third market.49 On balance then, the third
45 It is important to consider that the institutions indirectly represent many people

who may not be actual investors in the stock market per se, but who nonetheless represent some public interest.
46 Id.
47 Id.

48 SPECTAL STuDY 903. Because the Stock Exchange has recognized the need for
special plans to augment the regular auction market machinery, the third market could
be viewed as competing with these special plans and not with the regular transactions.
49 Id. 905..
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market appears as a decidedly pro-competitive force, in many instances
merely complimenting the NYSE. In any case, it generates an investment climate which certainly favors the general investing citizenry.5 0
THE SCOPE OF EXCHANGE RULES

Considerable controversy has been generated by judicial efforts
to ascertain the precise legal nature of exchange rules. 51 For instance,
in Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co.,52 a case concerning the implied civil liability of a brokerage firm for breach of an exchange rule,
Judge Friendly held that exchange rules were not included within the
"'rules and regulations" of section 27, the jurisdictional section of the
1934 Act. Thus, no basis for implied civil liability could be predicated
on such a breach. However, the court did recognize the possibility of
such liability given certain circumstances5s Whatever the legal status
5od. The Special Study viewed the third market's effect favorably, concluding that
the advantages of competition generally outweigh any concern over impairment
of depth in the primary market. It would appear that the third market has
developed in the shadow of the NYSE only by dint of its ability to perform a
useful function.... Unlike the unlisted stocks traded over-the-counter, freedom
from investor safeguards is not a fictor in the case of the listed stocks traded
off board .... The very existence of this market to satisfy needs not met by the
exchange market is indeed affirmation of the inherent strength and viability of a
system of free markets.
Id. 908 (footnote omitted).
51 See Note, Private Actions as a Remedy for Violations of Stock Exchange Rules, 83
HAv. L. REv.825, 831 (1970) wherein one interpretation has been expressed which denies
to the exchange rules the same force as the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rules
enacted thereunder. As the writer points out, there is strong basis for this viewpoint, inasmuch as the SEC has disavowed any power to directly enforce exchange rules. This is
some indication that the Commission considers violations of such rules as not being a
breach of the Exchange Act.
52 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
53 That depends, the court stated, on "the nature of the particular rule and its place
in the regulatory scheme." 358 F.2d at 182. As one writer has suggested:
Ostensibly the court meant that a stock exchange rule could be the basis for
implied civil liability if it were violated in regard to its investor-protection function. and if such function had an integral role in the regulatory scheme of the
1934 Act.
Note, Stock Exchange Rules- Implied Civil Liability Under the Securities Exchange.Act
of 1934 For Breach of the "Know Your Customer" Rule, 44 TUL. L. Rav. 633, 638 (1970).
See Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1969)
where the court in applying this test held that a breach of an exchange rule by a
member broker will give rise to an implied federal liability for damages as a violation of
section 6 of the Exchange Act where it is shown that the rule's purpose is to further
the statutory mandates of the Exchange Act in protecting investors.
If then, it can be demonstrated that an Exchange rule occupies such an integral position within the framework of the 1934 Act as to give rise to federal civil liability, the
rule is undoubtedly being treated as the equivalent of a rule or regulation promulgated
under the Act and therefore as a federal law. However, it must be borne in mind that
the Colonial decision holds the party asserting such civil liability to a heavier burden of
proof in the case of an Exchange rule "than when the violation is of the statute or an
SEC regulation" 358 F.2d at 182. In addition, Judge Friendly warned that the inevitable
results of permitting carte blanche federal liability in these situations would be an inun-

19711

RULE 394

of these rules, their internal significance is pervasive. Matters involving
suspension and expulsion of members for various reasons are entirely
governed by the constitutional provisions of the Exchange as enforced
by the Board of Governors.54
Considering the recent decisions that have applied the Colonial
test,55 and have thus held NYSE members civilly liable for violations
of Exchange rules, one might, analogously, impose liability upon
member firms for adhering to a rule which necessarily results in
added costs to his customer. While conceptually there might be some
basis from a historical standpoint for such an extension of liability, 0
it seems patently unreasonable that liability should be premised on a
failure to avoid a rule (such as rule 394) when such avoidance would
assuredly result in the member's estrangement from the Exchange and
the loss of its trading privileges. More importantly, the rule, in terms
of the purposes of the Exchange Act might be determined to be necessary to make the Exchange Act work.57 Until such a decision the rule
has full binding force on the NYSE and they are obliged to adhere to
its provisions.
RULE 394
Rule 394 is a derivative of section 8, Article XIV of the NYSE
constitution which places restrictions on member firms to prevent dealings off the Exchange. 5 That section was interpreted, however, until
dation of customer-broker suits on the federal courts, actions peculiarly within the

jurisdictional realm of the states. More serious however is the possible usurpation of state
power to decide these cases that would result. 358 F.2d at 183.
54 The general provision covering suspension and expulsion for violations of the
constitution and rules and regulations of the Exchange is Artide XIV, section 6., CCH, 2
NEw YoRx STOCK EXCHANGE GUIDE
1656. In addition, Article XIV, section 8, the
constitutional basis for rule 394, concerning dealings by members outside the Exchange in
listed securities, carries with it the sanctions of suspension or expulsion for violation of
its provisions.
55 See Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.
1969); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 385 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 817 (1966); cf. DeRenzio v. Levy, 297 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Kroese v. NYSE,
227 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y 1964); see also Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based on Stock
Exchange Rules, 66 COLUm. L. REv. 12 (1966).
56 See, e.g., American Live Stock Comm'n Co. v. Chicago Live Stock Exch., 143

Ill. 210, 32 N.E. 274 (1892) holding that if an exchange passes rules or by-laws which
are contrary to law or public policy and proceeds to enforce these rules against an unwilling minority of its members, such prejudiced members are entitled to appeal to the
courts for relief against their enforcement. Thus liability might be predicated upon the
failure of the NYSE members to have the rule enjoined by a competent tribunal.
57 Cf. Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
58 Rule 394 states:

(a) Except as otherwise specifically exempted by the Exchange, members and
member organizations must obtain the permission of the Exchange before effecting a transaction in a listed stock off the Exchange, either as principal or agent.
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the late 1940's as restricting member firms from making private markets for their own accounts in listed securities but was not construed
(b) Solicitation of Non-Member Market-Makers. to Participate in Transactions
Off-the-Floor of the Exchange.
(1) A member or member organization holding a customer's round-lot
order.for the purchase or sale of stock may, if he so desires, solicit a qualified
non-member market-maker to participate in the execution of the order for
the non-member's own account, off-the-floor of the Exchange, provided he
has reported to a Floor Governor, other than the specialist in the stock,
thai all of the following conditions have been met:
' (A) A diligent effort to explore the feasibility of obtaining a satisfactory execution of the order on the floor has been made during that
market session.
(B) The member or member organization has provided the Floor
Governor with the following information:
(i) the name of the stock and size of the order;
(ii) details of the effort made to explore feasibility of obtaining
- a satisfactory execution of the order on the floor;
(iii) the number of shares, if any, he is taking or supplying for
his own account; and
(iv) the extent, if any, of the interest the specialist has indicated in participating at an indicated price or prices.
(2) A qualified non-member market-maker in a stock is a broker-dealer
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as a broker-dealer,
who meets the capital and other applicable requirements and who has
notified the Exchange that he is available to be solicited for his own account
by members and member organizations pursuant to this rule for bids and
offers in that stock.
(3) The member or member organization must file a report promptly
after the completion of a transaction made pursuant to this rule listing all
parties to the transaction; the amount of participation of each; the price;
the time of receipt of the order; the time of the off-Floor execution and
the name of the Governor to whom he reported.
. (4) Notwithstanding the provisions of rule 104, the specialist may buy
on a plus or zero plus tick or sell on a minus or zero minus tick, any or all
of the stock with respect to which a third market-maker is to be asked
to participate.
(5) Under the provision of this rule, a member must ask other members
in the crowd immediately prior to the off-Floor trade if they have orders to
execute at.the same price and on the same side of the market. If such be
the case, the non-member market-maker's bid or offer may be displaced in,
whole or in part by:
(i) any or all bids or offers at the price on the specialist's book
and any or all bids or offers made by other brokers acting as agents
for other than Registered Traders, registered odd-lot dealers or
members or member organizations known by the broker to be acting
for their own account; or
(ii) the specialist in the stock, acting as a dealer, if the specialist before the third market-maker was solicited, advised the member
or member organization of the extent of his interest at an indicated
price or prices at which the transaction is to be made.
(6) No member shall effect a purchase for its customer from a marketmaker if, on the basis of information supplied to the member by the marketmaker, the market-maker's transaction would involve a short sale on a
minus or zero minus tick based on Exchange transactions at the time of the
solicitation; provided, however, that this shall not prohibit a transaction
which includes a short sale of less than one round lot.
2 CCH NYSE GumFD 2394 (1969).
Listed below are examples of situations that would not comply with rule
894(b). The rule is intended only to apply to situations where member firms
have solicited the participation of a qualified non-member market-maker. If, in
the course of such a solicitation, the non-member market-maker asks to participate in the purchase or sale of any other security or of the same security in a
different transaction, that transaction does not qualify under rule 394(b).
(1) A member firm solicits a qualified non-member market-maker to
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as to prevent members from executing agency transactions off the
floor of the Exchange. 59 In other words, nothing prevented a member
from, acting as a broker.for his customer and seeking a better execution off the floor of the Exchange.
Later construction of section 8 applied the restrictions to some
agency transactions, "but only to the extent that such an execution did
not benefit the customer or was not requested by him."' 0 It is therefore
evident that the third -market was considered an economic threat to
the NYSE, and that the Exchange did recognize the duty to seek
better executions off the Exchange if it would benefit a member's
customer. The reversal of this position was seemingly motivated by
self-interest considerations to protect the Exchange market and so
priorities were shifted, relegating the customer's right to a better price
secondary. to the protection of the Exchange's monopolistic position.
In 1948, the Exchange issued Circular 52 which for the first time
required prior approval by the Exchange before a member could transact off the floor.61 In 1952, the Exchange rejected its former position
whereby permission for agency trading off the floor was granted when
such trading proved to be advantageous to a member's customer. However, this change of position was not unanimous. In fact, it conflicted
with an earlier policy adopted by the Board of Governors which had
granted to staff officials of the Exchange the authority to approve cerparticipate in the purchase or sale of stock X. The market-maker is not
interested in stock X but tells the member firm to solicit him in some other
listed stock in which he does have an interest. If the member firm then
solicits the market-maker in response to such request, a subsequent transaction in that other stock would not qualify under rule 394(b). It must take
place on board with a full commission charged to the nonmember marketmaker.
(2) A qualified non-member market-maker advises, other than by the
-.
ordinary written advertisements, notification, or publication, a particular
member firm during the day that he wishes to be solicited in a given stock
or stocks. The subsequent solicitation by the member finn, in response to the
.third market-maker's request, will disqualify the resulting transaction from
qualifying under rule 394(b).
(3) A member firm has an understanding with a qualified non-member
market-maker to solicit him under rule 394(b) whenever he has customers'
orders in these stocks in which the third market-maker is qualified. Such
an understanding will disqualify any transaction made pursuant to the understanding from rule 394(b). Any effort to accomplish indirectly that which
is not directly permitted by the rule, or the intent of the rule as indicated in
the rule itself, and the supplementary material, will result in the transaction
not qualifying under the rule.
Id. 2394.10.
59'See Re-Inquiry Into Exchange Restrictions on Member's Off-Board Trading

(Brief submitted by Weeden & Co. in response to SEC Release No. 8791, Dec. 31, 1969)
[hereinafter Weeden Comments].
60 SEC, Rules, Regulations and Practices Relating to Off-Board Trading, Conclusions
and Recommendations (1965) in BANK SToCK Q., Nov. 7, 1968, at 46 [hereinafter Staff

Study].

61 Id.at 45.
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tain transactions off the floor.62 As a result, requests for off-board
trading decreased as this new policy became commonly known among
the members.6 3 In 1957, implicitly recognizing the existence of the
third market as an economic threat, the New York Stock Exchange felt
it necessary to adopt a specific rule to deal with the problem. Hence,
rule 394 was adopted. The rule prevented members from dealing as
principals or agents in effecting off-board transactions in listed securities with non-members. However, the Exchange could exempt certain
stocks from the application of the rule.
Prior to 1957, the policy of the Exchange concerning off-board
transactions was thus permissive in nature. For, although a member
could not trade as a dealer for his own account (as a principal), he
could trade as a broker, i.e., on an agency basis.
The effect of the rule change is strikingly illustrated by the results
produced when Chase Manhattan Bank Stock became a listed security.
Non-member dealers had, prior to its being listed, traded substantially
in Chase Manhattan Stock, and with the 1964 amendments to the- Exchange Act, allowing listing of these shares on the Exchange, the Board
of Governors immediately declared the rule applicable to the Chase
Stock, and refused to exempt the issue from its application. Thus,
they were literally cut off from dealing with NYSE members in Chase
Stock.
In 1966 Schapiro & Co. requested the SEC to order the NYSE to
rescind or modify rule 394.4 The ultimate result was the adoption of
rule 394(b) by the Exchange. Insistance upon the change in rule 394
by the SEC no doubt reflected its dissatisfaction with the rule as evidenced by the conclusions it reached in its 1965 study of the rule.
The modified rule's purpose was to define the procedures to permit
members of the Exchange to execute a customer's order off the board
with qualified non-member market-makers. The SEC had found that
a change was "necessary and appropriate in the public interest and
for the protection of investors and necessary for the execution of
its functions under the (Securities Exchange) Act." 65
62 Id. at 46.

63 Id.; see SEC Hearings in the matter of Rate Structure Investigation of National
Securities Exchanges 4017 (1968) (Testimony of Donald Weeden) [hereinafter Hearings].
The witness testified that the rule was the result of "competitive pressures exerted by the
third market and regional exchanges responding to the demands of informed institutional
business." See generally Hearings 265, 714, 1484, 3858, 3904, 3933, 4016, 4061, 4333-40,
4537, 4552, 4720, 5061-92, 5096, 5150 and 5317 for pertinent material relating to rule
394. (These hearings were initiated in 1968 and are still in progress.)
64 BANK STocK Q., Nov. 7, 1968, at 30.

65 Stock Exchanges Under Public Scrutiny, BANK STOCK Q., Nov. 7, 1968, at 40. Staff
Study at 46. See Hearings 4010, where testimony was elicited which demonstrated the
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In its earlier study the Commission had found that rule 394 in its
original form had prevented brokers from obtaining better executions
off the floor of the Exchange and that one of the purposes of the rule
was to inhibit competition of the member firm and non-member dealer
with the specialist and was "geared to the economic interest of Exchange members." 66
The SEC also found that while rule 394 may have preserved the
depth and liquidity of the primary auction market, it accomplished
such results at the expense of the competing third market. For these
and other reasons the SEC concluded that the rule needed revision
and the Commission recommended the adoption of a permissive rather
!than mandatory policy concerning off-board transactions by members
67
of the Exchange.
The adoption of rule 394(b) has apparently done little to resolve
the problems. The amended rule immediately drew criticism basically
because it did little to end the discrimination practiced against third
market dealers. An examination of several factors demonstrates why
-the modification has been ineffectual. To begin with the procedures
of rule 394(b) are cumbersome and inefficient. This alone discourages
its utilization by members of the Exchange. 8
Comparisons of similar rules on regional exchanges reinforce
this criticism leveled against 394(b). Rule 6 of the Midwest Exchange
is illustrative.6 9 The differences between rule 6 and 394(b) are sigrelationship of the third market-maker to the Exchange market specialist. The witness
testified that as third market-makers they operate exactly like the specialist on the
Exchange and thus are in competition with him, each making market for stocks. The
market-makers sell the shares at a net price while the specialists make a market and offer
,stock at a specific price. A broker then would take the stock from the specialist and sell
it to his customer at that price plus a commission.
66 Staff Study at 56. The Commission's report went on to conclude that
[t]he publication of Member Firm Circular 52 and the evolving restrictive interpretations of rule 394, were the direct result of competitive markets being made
by non-members. In addition .... rule 394, reflected a decision by the Exchange
that all non-members be required to pay a minimum commission on the execution
of any order to which they were a party; this decision was enforced through requiring all executions to be done on the floor of the Exchange irrespective of
whether the non-member was using the member as its agent.
67 Id. at 47.
68 See, e.g., Weeden Comments, supra note 59, at 10.
69 The applicable part of rule 6 of the Midwest Exchange is as follows:
No member, member firm or member corporation shall buy, offer to buy, sell
or offer to sell shares of stock in issues admitted to dealings on the Exchange off
the Floor of the Exchange unless permissions shall be requested in writing. ...
Cited in BANK STOCK Q., Nov. 7, 1968 at 33. See Hearings, Jan. 7, 1969, at 4333. The
officials of the Midwest Exchange testified that the basic philosophy behind its rule is to
permit off-floor transactions if advantageous to the customer. Furthermore the fixed
-commission charge is not imposed on the non-member market-maker when and if he
solicits a transaction on the Midwest Exchange. The witness explained that:
Our member is free to seek the best possible price for his customer and we figure

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:812

nificant. The NYSE rule requires a member after receiving a bid or
offer from a third market-maker to return to the floor of the Exchange
where such bids or offers may be displaced by those made on the floor
of the Exchange. Such is not the case on the Midwest Exchange. The
Midwest rule places no restrictions on non-members soliciting trades
from members of its exchange whereas such action under 394(b) would
result in a disqualification of the transaction. It is also important to
note that when seeking to proceed under 394(b) a NYSE member must
go to the floor first. If a member should seek a quote from the third
market first and then come to the floor to obtain permission to go off
70
the board under 394(b), permission would be denied.
The testimony offered by the NYSE to justify the imposition of
rule 394 abounds in rhetoric and little else. The rule is defended on
the ground that it is a necessary, protective measure to insure the
depth and liquidity of the auction market, an objective which the
Exchange contends is in the public interest. Characterizing third
market dealers as parasitic and proliferous to the point of being a cancerous threat to the viability of the primary market, the Exchange
insists that the rule must remain in force if the central market place
is to remain the fulcrum of the securities industry. Such "undermining" by third market dealers, the Exchange posited, must be prevented.71
Robert Haack, the president of the NYSE, also testified, couching
his defense of rule 394 in terms of the regulatory disparities between
the Exchange and the third market. Intimating that the NYSE is subjected to more stringent regulation and thus is a more protective
market, Haack criticized the fact that dual standards exist in relation
to the NYSE specialist and the third market dealer. According to Mr.
Haack one such disparity exists concerning the respective marketmakers' ability to keep its customers informed. Whereas the NYSE
makes data available through its ticker service and transaction journals,
nothing comparable exists in the third market. The degree of regulation imposed on each of these market-makers varies greatly. While
the specialist on the Exchange is subject to rigid financial requirements in addition to numerous measures to insure a "fair and orderly"
market, his counterpart in the third market is subject to no such surveillance. To the market-maker the prime motivation is profit. If it
that he will be charging the commission, or a commission equivalent because we
think in dealing with his customer, he is entitled to that remuneration.
70 See Hearings 5129 (testimony of G. Levy, former Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the NYSE).
71 See Hearings 5061-62, 5117, 5127. See also Baxter, supra note 5, at 708-09.
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becomes unprofitable to trade in certain issues, he can abruptly cease
to trade in that issue, whereas, the specialist, under a duty to maintain
markets for the issues he trades, does not enjoy such ease of exit.72

These claims of the NYSE have not been unchallenged. As to the
particular charge that the abolition of rule 394 would serve to fractionalize the primary auction market, i.e., destroy the necessary liquidity and depth of that market, it has been contended that just the opposite would result in terms of the overall market for securities, that is,
the third market adds rather than detracts from the depth and liquidity
of the overall market. In fact, it is in the case of block transactions
that the need for such an additional market becomes critical.
The view has been expressed that the auction market lacks the
flexibility to assume the bulging demand that has been created by the
advent of increased institutional participation in securities. Such large
orders create a disequilibrium which inevitably results in the breakdown of the auction system. A negotiated market then develops, requiring position takers and the necessary capital to absorb the generated
transactions. The third market, it is claimed, provides a substantial
amount of position-taking ability and serves to augment rather than
detract from the overall market. In so doing, it provides more stability
and depth to the total trading picture. 73
Closely akin to third market trading of listed securities is the
m ultiple trading of those issues that takes place on regional exchanges
throughout the country. Since third market transactions are considered
in substance a form of multiple trading, some of the arguments favoring multiple trading on regional exchanges might be considered in reference to the allegation that the dissipation of trading to the third market destroys the depth and liquidity of the auction market. The results
of a Stanford Research Institute Study entitled The Economic Functions
of Modern Regional Stock Exchanges74 tends to refute this argument of
the NYSE with respect to the regional exchanges. The study concerned
itself with the primary issue of "whether multiple trading of listed
securities may be expected to impair market 'quality' or liquidity by
diverting trading to regional exchanges." 75 The conclusions of this
study clash with the NYSE charges of fragmentation. The study stated
that it is unlikely that depth or liquidity would suffer because of multiple trading and that, in fact, it appears likely that multiple trading
72 Hearings 5151-52. The obvious answer to this situation would be more effective
regulation of all transactions where a broker-dealer is trading for his own account.
73 Hearings 4015-16.
74 See Hearings 4482-85.
75 Id. 4482.
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tends to enhance liquidity because of the competition it generates
between primary and secondary market specialists. 76 In more specific
language the study stated:
The only important economic argument advanced against
competition in multiply-traded securities is that diversion of trading activity to secondary markets tends to impair the depth of the
primary markets. The extent to which depth impairment actually
occurs is indeterminate since it is also reasonable to expect -and
is widely believed - that multiple trading tends to broaden investor interest in a security. 77
As to liquidity, the Stanford Study concluded that competition
between primary and secondary specialists has served to enhance it.
Additionally, the cost of liquidity was found to be reduced by the
increases in competition. 8 One third market dealer testified that
third market capital tends to compliment that of the exchange specialist and thus adds stability and liquidity to the overall market.79 In addition, the witness offered as evidence the price stability of certain listed
utility stocks which are traded in the third market to refute the Exchange's argument that fragmentation leads to greater price swings. 0
The NYSE has submitted its own study entitled Economic Effects
of Negotiated Commission Rates on the Brokerage Industry, the Market for Corporate Securities, and the Investing Public,8 ' which it
claims supports its argument that multiple trading in listed securities
tends to weaken its own market. The study asserts:
Recent research studies confirm the important economies of scale
achieved by concentrating transactions in a particular stock on a
single exchange. Centralizing orders in a single market reduces
2
bid-offer spreads and increases the ability to handle volume.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. 4483. The Stanford Study further points out that
when a market is so unbalanced that a primary market specialist must take a
substantial position in order to preserve price continuity and orderliness, diversion of orders to regional exchanges can remove some of the pressure or price
by supplementing the capital of the primary market specialist with that of the
competing regional specialist. If a regional specialist takes a position when blocks
are offered in the tegional (sic) market, the pressure on the primary market
specialist is immediately reduced. Even though the regional specialist may ultimately liquidate his position in the primary market, he will do so at a later
date and usually at a limit, and thereby tend to promote liquidity.
Id. 4487.
79 Hearings 4020.
so Id. 4015.
81 See Hearings 4492-15 (NYSE Exhibit 20) (cited in Pacific Coast Exchange testimony).
82 Hearings 16 (NYSE Exhibit 20).
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The Exchange relied heavily on a paper published by Professor Harold
Demsetz in making the above assertion.8 3 It claims that studies by Dem-

setz and others confirm that
...[f]ractionalized equity markets produce wider spreads in quotations. These diseconomies of scale or operational inefficiencies
are virtually inevitable once a central auction for stocks becomes
weakened. 84
The Exchange study also contends that Professor Demsetz's study fully
supports the conclusion that:
A splintering of the NYSE central market would undoubtedly
reduce the ability of specialists to handle volume and to minimize
short-run price fluctuations, i.e., to provide a continuous, liquid,
and deep auction market. The loss of trades on the floor would
make for a "thinner" auction market and for wider spreads between bid and asked quotations.85
Professor Demsetz, however, has criticized the NYSE study, especially
in the use of his paper, contending that the NYSE study, in fact,
misinterpreted his conclusions.8 6 Indeed, he testified that his study
did not suggest or imply that there should, for all time, be one central
market for any particular stock.8 7 When questioned as to the desirability of having a rule requiring that all transactions be brought to a
centralized market, Professor Demsetz replied that he would not favor
such a rule but rather felt that the cheapest avenue should be open
to firms and investors. 88 While offering the view that at the present
time the NYSE was the cheapest place to deal he said so with reservations, noting that "I have no reason to believe that this will always
be the case." 8 9 In his article, Professor Demsetz pointed out the existence of competing markets as one form of competition that would
tend to keep the observed spread close to the specialist's cost, an
economically desirable objective from the standpoint of investors. 0
There are two predominant arguments lodged against rule 394:
83

See Demsetz, The Cost of Transacting,Q.J. EcoN. 33-53 (Feb. 1968).

84 Hearings 24 (NYSE Exhibit 20).
851d. 34.
86 Hearings 18 (Demsetz Exhibit 1).
87 Hearings 3817-18.
88 Id. 3857.
89Id. Professor Demsetz, when asked for his opinion as an economist whether

the NYSE should be prohibited from combining in order to offer the services of a centralized market in competition with other people who necessarily would offer a variety of
markets, explained that he was not in favor of prohibiting member firms from trading
elsewhere if they wish to.
90 Demsetz, supra note 83, at 43.
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(1) that the rule causes the member broker-dealer on the Exchange to
breach his common-law fiduciary duty to obtain the most favorable
execution for his customer, 91 and (2) that rule 394 constitutes a group
boycott or concerted refusal to deal and as such is violative of federal
antitrust law.
Concerning the first argument, authorities, along with opponents
and critics of rule 394 have indicated a belief that the operative effect
of the rule results in a violation of this common-law duty.9 2 Although
91 See, e.g., Schlesinger, supra note 8, at 652 n.71 and accompanying text; Jennings,
The New York Stock Exchange and the Commission Rate Struggle, 21 Bus. LAw. 159,
169, 170 (1965); Loss 3168.
M. A. Schapiro & Co., Inc., a New York broker-dealer specializing in bank securities
has led the fight against rule 394. Morris A. Schapiro, through his company's publication,
Bank Stock Quarterly, has persistently attacked its continued application. See BANK
STocK Q., Nov. 1968, 10, 28. This issue contains a compendium of previously published
articles historically sketching the "394 Saga"; see also Statement of Morris A. Schapiro
Before the Securities Exchange Commission at the Hearing on November 7, 1968 on the
Subject of Competition Between Securities Markets, at 7; Comments of Schapiro & Co. in
response to SEC Release No. 8791 (Dec. 31, 1969), Re Inquiry Into Exchange Restrictions on Member's Off-Board Trading, at 8; Comments of Weeden & Co. in response to
SEC Release No. 8791 (Dec. 31, 1969), Re Inquiry Into Exchange Restrictions on Member's Off-Board Trading, at 3-4; SEC, Hearings in the Matter of SEC Rate Structure
Investigation of National Securities Exchanges, 4016-61 (testimony of Donald E. Weeden);
Brief of the United States Department of Justice in response to SEC Release No. 8791
(Dec. 31, 1969), Re Inquiry Into Exchange Restrictions on Member's Off-Board Trading,
at 16-17.
It is significant to note that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 did not operate to
preempt common-law rights, which might have been fully adjudicated and enforced in
a state forum prior to the enactment of the Exchange Act. See Beury v. Beury, 127 F.
Supp. 786, 790 (S.D. W. Va. 1954); section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78 aa provides:
The district courts of the United States, and the United States courts of any
Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce
any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder ....
And section 28(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) provides that:
The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any and
all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity; but no person
permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this chapter
shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions, a total
amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained of...
One court has held that section 27 fixes the venue of actions referred to in section 28 in
the federal courts. See American Distilling Co. v. Brown, 295 N.Y. 36, 39, 64 N.E.2d 347,
348 (1945). Moreover, it is clear that suits brought to enforce rights and duties created
by the Exchange Act are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts; McCollum
v. Billings, 53 Misc. 2d 661, 279 N.Y.S.2d 609 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1967). The
McCollum court rejected the view that the SEA preempts the existing common-law rights,
finding "a more likely construction of the statute is that it confers exclusive jurisdiction
on federal courts to entertain only those actions which involve some right of recovery
which go beyond such common-law rights." Id. at 664-65, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 614. See also
Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 252 F. Supp. 240
(S.D.N.Y. 1966). Nevertheless the federal courts still have the power to take cognizance of
any non-federal claims under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.
92 See Hearings 5130-31.
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there is same disagreement as to what constitutes the "best execution"
it is clear that lower prices are available in the third market. However,
it is one thing to allege that the price in the third market is less than
on the Exchange and quite another to contend that a rule, as yet
quite legal, causes a member to breach his principal-agent relationship
with his customer. 93 While the rule may effectively prevent a member
from seeking the cheaper price, it has not been adjudicated by any
competent tribunal that the rule violates any law. in fact, it could be
found to be a necessary part of Exchange regulation. In the event that
the rule is struck down by the SEC or through the antitrust machinery
of the courts, this fact, that a customer is denied a more competitive
price would undoubtedly be of primary concern in reaching such a
decision. But, until such an event occurs, the "breach of the fiduciary
duty" argument is premature.
Related Issues
Interrelated with the major assault against the continued imposition of rule 394 are several related contentions which merit some
observation. It is claimed that the Exchange illegally discriminates
against third market dealers in that it permits its own members to go
off the Exchange and trade in listed securities on the regional exchanges or where trading is permitted in exempted securities while
denying them the opportunity to transact business in the third market." The Exchange's justification for this discriminatory treatment
is less than convincing. Its only explanation reveals that it considers
itself powerless to prevent its members who are also members of a
regional exchange from trading in that market. 9 Furthermore, if a
single member of the Exchange desires to trade on a regional exchange,
there is no rule restricting such activity even though this "lack of control" explanation has no application in that case. Additionally, it is
maintained that Congress has given the SEC the power to change the
rules of National Securities Exchanges where such changes are "deemed
necessary and appropriate for the protection of investors or to insure
93 See Hearings 5137. (restimony on behalf of NYSE by G. Levyformer chairman
of the Board). Witness Levy testified that the broker does not have the obligation to seek
out the third market because when his client gives him an order, he expects it to be
executed on the Exchange. He also claimed that since the existence of the third market
is well-known, the client knows that unless in the judgment of a member firm, a proper
execution is unobtainable, the transaction will occur on the NYSE. For a detailed discussion of broker-dealer activity under the Exchange Act see Cohen & Rabin, Broker-Dealer
Selling Practice Standards: The Importance of Administrative Adjudication in Their
Development, 29 LAw & CONTMP. PROB. 691 (1964).
94 Rule 394 (b) on Probation,BANK STOCK Q., Nov. 7, 1968, at 36.
95 Hearings 5058.
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fair dealing in securities traded in, upon such exchange or to insure
fair administration of such exchange." 96 Such power, it is argued,
should be exercised in light of the disparate treatment resulting from
the application of rule 394.97

Furthermore, it has been submitted that there exists a clearcut
conflict of interest involving member firms on the Exchange. All
members of the NYSE are also members of National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) and as such are presumably bound by its
rules and regulations. It is thus postulated that rule 394 prevents members of the Exchange who are also members of NASD from dealing
with fellow members of that organization and thereby provides their
customers with "the benefit of the diversity and competition which
may exist in the inter-dealer market." 98 A counterpart of this "conflict
of interest" argument is the assertion that Exchange members are
prima facie violating section 8 of the Clayton Act9 9 by maintaining
and perpetuating interlocking directorates.
TROUBLE IN PARADISE:

RULE 394

UNDER THE ANTITRUST MICROSCOPE 10 0

Notwithstanding the assumption that the operation of rule 394
does not effect a breach of the broker's fiduciary duty to his customer,
the question still exists as to the very legality of such restriction under
the antitrust laws. The essence of this challenge against the rule is
that it amounts to a concerted refusal to deal by Exchange members
in violation of the Sherman Act. As will be seen, this second charge
is well supported by analogous case law and raises a serious question
concerning the validity of rule 394.
Probing The PrimaryJurisdiction Problem
In concentrating upon the applicability of the antitrust laws to
exchange practices' and rules, there lurks in the shadows a pro96 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1964).
97 See Statement of Morris A. Schapiro before the Securities and Exchange Commis-

sion at the hearing on November 7, 1968 on the subject of Competition Between the
Securities Markets 5 [hereinafter Schapiro].
98 Id.
99 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1964).
100 Readers accustomed to observing more traditional forms of micro-organisms will
recall that, for best results, it is necessary to keep both eyes open when using this
apparatus.
101 The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to antitrust situations
has, in general, been subject to staunch criticism. One writer has stated that the doctrine
has evolved from a "choice of forum rule to a substantive, judge-made exemption from
the competitive dictates of the antitrust laws." Schwartz, infra note 102, at 446; see also
Jaffe, infra note 102, at 598. Professor Schwartz has chastised the judiciary for relinquishing
its responsibility to formulate national economic policy by its invocation of the "primary"
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cedural device capable of postponing or preventing judicial resolution
of the issues. That device is, of course, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Legal scholars have substantially differed on the doctrine's
1 02
utility and its limitations.
It has been simply explained as a device to determine which forum
-agency

or court -

will make the incipient ruling in the matter.1 03

One writer's definition is as follows:
Primary jurisdiction is a judgmade doctrine resting upon consideration of effective regulation. It holds that, whenever "cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges
or cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion" are
presented to the courts, the courts should not adjudicate until
issues of fact and discretion have been passed on by the regulatory
agency concerned. 0 4
doctrine in the antitrust sector. See id. 473. However, these charges have met with rebuttal
from several authorities. See, e.g., 3 DAvis, ADMINSTRATIVE LAW 35-39 (1958) [hereinafter
DAvis]; see also Stokes, infra note 102. Professor Davis seems to answer Professor Schwartz's
complaint of "judicial abdication" by stating that the fault, if any, is to be found with
the substantive policy of review and not with the timing of judicial intervention. DAvis
37. Alleviating some of this fear are the ameliorating effects of judicial review.
After the administrative determination has been made, and after the regulatory
advantages of departing from the principle of competition have been developed,
the reviewing court will then be in a position to weigh the pros and cons of the
overall problem, and on the question of fundamental policy, to substitute its
judgment to whatever extent may seem desirable in the circumstances.

DAvis 27.
Perhaps of greater significance is the fact that the scope of judicial review of agency
determinations has been severely limited by the Supreme Court. Baxter, supra note 102,

at 686. The danger lies in the fact that this has been the court's policy even when the
ramifications of such an agency resolution extend considerably beyond the borders of

agency responsibility. Id. If the resolution is left to the agency, even initially, it creates
the possibility that substantive antitrust policy might be overwhelmed by a narrow atti-

tude towards judicial review.
102 See generally Baxter, New York Stock Exchange Fixed Commission Rates: A Private Cartel Goes Public, 22 STAN. L. REv. 675, 688-91 (1970); Hale & Hale, Competition
or Control VI: Application of Antitrust Laws to Regulated Industries, 111 U. PA. L. REV.
46, 48-51 (1962); Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction,77 HYA~v. L. REv. 1037 (1964); Jaffe, Primary
Jurisdiction Reconsidered, The Antitrust Laws, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 577 (1954); Schwartz,
Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of Judicial
Responsibility, 67 HAv. L. REv. 436, 438 (1954); Stokes, A Few Irreverent Comments
About Antitrust, Agency Regulation, and PrimaryJurisdiction, 3 Gro. WASH. L. REv. 529
(1964); von Mehren, The Antitrust Laws and Regulated Industries: The Doctrine of
Primary Jurisdiction, 67 HARv. L. REv. 929 (1954). See also DAvis c. 19.
103 DAvis 2. Professor Davis emphasizes the point that the doctrine does not concern
itself with the question of who will make the final decision. Id.
104 von Mehren, supra note 102, at 929, citing Far East Conference v. United States,
342 U.S. 570, 574 (1952). Another writer views the doctrine as requiring "judicial abstention in cases where protection of the integrity of a regulatory scheme dictates preliminary
resort to the agency which administers the scheme." Stokes, supra note 102, at 531, citing
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 353 (1962). Still another legal scribe
sees the doctrine as merely a device to determine who will have "home court advantage"
-the
agency or the court. Baxter, supra note 102, at 683.
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Another eminent commentator on Administrative Law sees the
doctrine as
...

an attempt to resolve the procedural and substantive conflicts

inevitably created when there is carried out for an agency an area
of original jurisdiction which impinges on the conegeries of original jurisdictions of the courts. 105
Why initial resort to the agency is desirable is best answered by the
Supreme Court, which has upheld the "primary" doctrine in the interest of the orderly administration of an agency's regulatory functions.10
Although the Supreme Court has only once addressed the problem
of applying the antitrust scheme to Exchange activity, 10 7 its treatment
or, rather, its non-treatment of the primary jurisdiction issue in Silver
casts serious doubts as to its applicability in future adjudications of
stock exchange rules and practices. The Silver Court avoided'0 8 confrontation with the doctrine on the ground that although the SEC
under section 19(b) of the Exchange Act could seek changes in the
rules of the New York Stock Exchange, the Act did not grant to the
105 Jaffe, supra note 102, at 1037. Professor Jaffe has rejected any simplistic approach
in explaining the essence of the doctrine. See id. He portrays the setting in which the
doctrine comes to bear thusly:
Primary jurisdiction situations arise when the original jurisdiction of a court is
being invoked to decide the merits of a controversy: the facts, the law, the relief;
and it is held that the jurisdiction of the court either to decide one of the
relevant issues or to entertain the action at all has been superseded by agency
jurisdiction.
Id. 1037-38.
One criticism of the expansive application of the doctrine has been the fact that,
originally, the doctrine was intended to apply to situations where the agency and court
both had concurrent and original jurisdiction. See Stokes, supra note 102, at 532, who is
strongly opposed to any carte blanche application of the doctrine.
105 See Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952) wherein the
Court stated:
Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a particular
agency are secured, and the limited functions of review by the judiciary are more
rationally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the
circumstances underlying legal issues to agencies that are better equipped than
courts by specialization, by insight gained through experience and by more
flexible procedure.
107See Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
108 The doctrine has also been circumvented when the subject matter of the controversy concerned conspiracy, on the basis that such activity traditionally has been the
peculiar problem of the judiciary. von Mehren, supra note 102, at 942; see, e.g., Georgia v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 824 U.S. 489 (1945). However, the Georgia case is considered abberrant by the authorities, von Mehren criticises this reasoning for shunning the doctrine
and points out that the majority in the Far East case rejected it outright, while the dissent adopted it. Indeed, the court opined that conspiracy was appropriate for agency consideration especially where technical problems are involved and where the kind of
competition is a vital concern of the regulatory body involved. Far East Conference v.
United States, 842 U.S. 570, 578 (1952), cited in von Mehren, supra note 102, at 942.

1971]

RULE 394

Commission any jurisdiction "to review particular instances of enforcement of Exchange rules."' 109
The court's reasoning on this issue has not existed in a criticismfree atmosphere. One authority, terming the court's handling of the
primary jurisdiction issue "sophistic," has intimated that the court
consciously evaded the doctrine. 110 This "absence of pervasive regulation" consideration' which influenced the court's decision is, however,
supported by Professor Louis L. Jaffe. Professor Jaffe has noted analogous situations where no pervasive control is exercised and where the
judiciary has been granted concurrent jurisdiction over practices
within the agency's area of concern." 2 Here "the courts generally have
' 3
exercised that jurisdiction without prior recourse.""
Insofar as the boycotting situation in Silver is concerned, Professor
William F. Baxter has argued that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
should have attached, allowing the SEC to resolve the problem under
its section 19(b) powers. 1114 According to Professor Baxter, the lower
court in Silver could have granted a continuance and, following the
SEC deliberations, implemented the necessary antitrust sanctions."n
Furthermore, the same writer charges that in refusing to so act, the
lower court was usurping a congressional grant of power, by its actions
which closely resembled the SEC functioning under its section 19(b)
powers, enabling the Commission to alter or add to Exchange rules.",
109 373 U.S. at 357. Justice Goldberg further stated that this lack of specific oversight
by the Exchange avoided any issue as to "conflict or coextensiveness of coverage with the
agency's regulatory power." Id. at 358; see also id. n.12. This reasoning of the court is,
however, at odds with the interpretations of several authorities on the subject of primary
jurisdiction. For instance, Professor Davis has stated that
Because of the purpose of the doctrine- to assure that the agency will not be
by-passed on what is especially committed to it-and because resort to the courts
is still open after the agency has acted, the doctrine applies even if the agency
has no jurisdiction to grant the relief sought.
DAvis 39.
Another writer contends that the agency's lack of jurisdiction is irrelevant:
The critical question should be the nature of the inquiry, for the doctrine rests
on the premise that, if administrative questions and technical matters are pre-

sented for determination, the agency must act before the court can adjudicate.
von Mehren, supra note 102, at 945.
But see Schwartz, Primary Administrative Jurisdiction and the Exhaustion of Litigants,
41 GEo. L.J. 495, 502 (1953), wherein the author states that if the agency is without the

power to grant the sought after relief, initial resort to the administrative body is a
fruitless endeavor and "a dichotomization of justice, which results only in needless
duplication of effort on plaintiff's part ....
" cited in DAvis 37 n.48.
110 Baxter, supra note 102, at 687; see id. at 687-88 for complete analysis of this criticism.
Ill See Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 350 (1963).
112 Jaffe, supra note 102, at 1041.
113 Id.
114 Baxter, supra note 102, at 687.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 688.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:812

Potentially, section 19(b)17 is broad enough in its language to
permit a pliant antitrust approach in dealing with Exchange rules." 8
In addition, there are precedential SEC decisions which have explicitly referred to antitrust principles in their determinations. 119
Indeed, there is a general body of case law fully supporting agency
determinations moulded against the background of antitrust considerations. 12 0 However, in light of the passivity displayed by the Commission

in utilizing its section 19(b) powers, such an aggressive undertaking
21
seems unlikely.'
117 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1964). Under section 19(b) the Commission is empowered to request
changes in exchange rules and, if these requests go unheeded, it may alter or supplement
the same. General criteria of fair dealing and investor protection serve to guide the SEC
in its decisions to change a rule. Despite the fact that the Commissioner's rule changing
power is limited to 13 areas of concern, and, that none of these categories refer explicitly
to anticompetitive practices, the last category, entitled "similar matters," is appropriately
broad to permit such a consideration. However, the SEC has been reluctant to utilize this
section.
A novel approach has been offered by one writer who suggests that the SEC exercise
its own rule making powers under section 10 and 11 of the Exchange Act. Under section
11 the Commission, while avoiding completely the mechanisms of self-regulation, can
enact its own rules directly affecting the exchanges and their members with respect to
off-floor trading by members. However, the SEC has not seen fit to follow this suggestion
regarding rule 394. It has continued to allow the Exchange to dictate what form and
shape its members' activity with non-members is going to take. See Jennings, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry: The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 29
LAw 8- CONTEMP. PROB. 663 (1964).
118 Accord, Note, Antitrust and The Securities Industry: Lessons From The Shipping
Industry, 55 CORNFLL L. Rlv. 96, 100 (1969).
119 See In re Nat'l Ass'n of Securities Dealers, 19 S.E.C. 424, 486-87 (1945); In re Rules
of NYSE, 10 S.E.C. 270 (1941).
120Despite the possible application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to a
particular Exchange activity, the agency is not precluded from considering antitrust
principles in its decision making process. See McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321
U.S. 67, 80 (1943) wherein the court recognized that agencies may be obliged to consider
other legislative schemes when particular issues come before its tribunal which present
"overlapping and at times inconsistent policies embodied in other legislation enacted at
different times and with different problems in view." The court in Hale v. FCC, 425 F.2d
556 (D.C. Cir. 1970), has recently spoken on this subject, adopting a concurring opinion
from one of its earlier decisions:
The decisions of the Supreme Court and this court over a period of at least 25
years have evolved and defined a substantial jurisprudence making clear that the
administration of federal regulatory statutes calling for determinations of the
public interest establish the authority, and in some instances the duty, of the
cognizant agency to take into account what has been aptly called the nation's
"fundamental national economic policy," namely the principles of the antitrust
laws....
It is fair synthesis of the cases that a statute providing for licensing or other regulation is presumed to permit consideration of antitrust principles, with the
harmonizing approach [applied to conflicts between antitrust policies and the
agency's other regulatory objectives] . .
unless a contrary intent appears expressly or by necessary implication.
Id. at 561.
121 Only once has the Commission asserted its power under 19(b) to strike down a
particular Exchange rule. See In re Rules of the New York Stock Exchange, 10 S.E.C. 270
(1941).
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The most recent decision regarding Exchange rules and the antitrust laws' 22 has again side stepped the primary jurisdiction issue.
However, the concurring opinion in that case, in which Chief Judge
Swygert advocated the invocation of the doctrine, 123 has been adopted
by that same Seventh Circuit in a recent case concerning the commodity exchanges and the antitrust laws. 124 Whether this decision represents a change in judicial attitudes towards anti-competitive practices
in the securities industry as well, remains to be seen. Of course, only
the Supreme Court can definitively answer this question.
It is submitted, that if the SEC demonstrates a willingness 25 to
constructively contribute to the resolution of anticompetitive practices, then, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should attach 2 thus
12 7
allowing the specialized knowledge of the agency its due weight.
However, such an abrupt change in policy seems unlikely in the near
future.'128 Perhaps the problem is more deeply rooted than is appar322 Thill Sec. Corp. v. NYSE, 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970).
123Judge Swygert envisioned the issue in Thill as being intimately bound up in
considerations of the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Specifically he sought to determine
whether the doctrine dictated prior resort to the SEC in adjudications regarding Exchange
rules. To aid in this determination, Judge Swygert offered this list of factors to be
considered:
[I]n resolving this issue the following questions, among others, might be considered on remand: (1) whether and to what extent the SEC is empowered to
consider antitrust laws and policy in fulfilling its duty of review of exchange
self-regulations; (2) whether an aggrieved party may initiate SEC review of exchange rules under the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act or the
Administrative Procedure Act; (3) whether and to what extent SEC expertise
would be useful in resolving in the first instance, the question of whether a given
rule is necessary to make the Securities Act work; and (4) whether the anticompetitive aims of the Sherman Act can be achieved without subjecting the
exchanges to treble damage suits which necessarily result if the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction is unavailable to the defendant in this case.
433 F-2d 277.
124 See Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., BNA, 107 SEc. REG. 9- L. Rn-. F-1 (June
23, 1971).
125 Perhaps the seed of change has already been sown. See SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 8239 (Jan. 26, 1968) expressing a view that the Commission shall consider more closely antitrust laws in its decisions.
126 Professor Jaffe has enumerated the various alternatives a court confronted, for
instance, with an Exchange rule adjudication can choose in reaching its decision:
If an agency has not been given power expressly to immunize from the
antitrust laws but merely to approve a transaction within the purpose of the
statute committed to its administration, the court may reach any of several
conclusions: that the antitrust law has been so far superseded that sanctions,
if any, are to come from the agency, or that there is a cause of action as to certain
sanctions and not as to others, or that unless the agency approves the transaction,
the antitrust laws are in force or, finally, that the agency's jurisdiction does not
at all displace the court's jurisdiction under the antitrust laws (though the
agency's views might be entitled to respect insofar as relevant).
Jaffe, supra note 102, at 1038-39.
127 For an adverse criticism of agency expertise see Schwartz, supra note 102, at 471-75.
For an opposite view see Stokes, supra note 102, at 538.
128 Professor Schwartz has criticized agencies, especially the personnel, for being
content with "small victories over those whom they regulate," while avoiding or post-
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ent.129 Possibly, a reappraisal of the concept of self-regulation is

needed.

30

Antitrust "Immunity" in Perspective: Silver v. NYSE
The application of the federal antitrust laws to the New York
Stock Exchange can be successful only if, in fact, the Exchange is subject to that statutory scheme, i.e., it is not exempted from the operation
of those laws. At common law, the securities and commodities exchanges
together enjoyed freedom from antitrust impingement and were free
to enforce their rules "and to take aggresive steps to hamper non-members."' 131 As long as the exchanges were reasonable in their actions, they
poning the more substantial issues. Schwartz, supra note 102, at 474. In some respects
self-regulation breeds this kind of attitude. The Commission relies heavily upon the
self-implementation of various measures by the Exchange itself. Indeed, the Exchange
adopts proposals for the Commission's approval. This failure by the agency to confront
the problems directly, inherent in self-regulation, may tend to cause a perpetual pingpong postponement of many consequential issues facing the industry.
129

See Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before the Senate Comm. on Banking

and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st &2d Sess. (1933-34), S.REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934);
H.R. RP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S.Doc. No. 185, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. (1934);
H.R. RE'. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), cited in Baxter, supra note 102, at 685. Based
on the legislative history of the Exchange Act, there was a definite lack of interest by
Congress in the problems concerning the competitive structure of the securities industry.
Emphasis was rather placed on the eradication of deceptive and manipulative practices. Id.
130 See, e.g., von Mehren, supra note 102, at 954; Schwartz, supra note 102, at 475;
Jaffe, supra note 102, at 1041; Stokes, supra note 102, at 532; see also Jennings, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry: The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 29
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 653 (1964); Cary, Administrative Agencies and the Securities and
Exchange Commission, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 653 (1964).
131 See generally Antitrust Exemptions, 33 ANTrRusT L.J. (1967) for a collection of

articles concerning the different areas of American industry that have been exempted
from the antitrust laws, including: Agricultural Cooperatives, Fisheries, Government
Contracts, Insurance, Labor, The Learned Professions, Ocean Shipping, Patent and
Copyrights, Professional Sports, Resale Price Maintenance, Small Business, State Approved
Transactions and Securities and Commodities Exchanges; see C. KAYSFN & D. TURNER,
ANTTRUsT POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIs 41 (1959) [hereinafter KAYsEN &
TURNER], wherein the authors comment on the exempted portion of American industry
and state that the standards imposed by the regulators are less rigorous than those in the
antitrust laws "so that the exemptions, combined with the operations of the regulatory
agencies, give market behavior in these industries a monopoly character of varying degrees
and form." For further analysis of the applicability of antitrust to the regulated sector and
a discussion of the exemption problem, see Johnson, The Application of the Antitrust
Laws to the Securities Industry, 20 Sw. L.J. 536, 546-54 (1966); see also Hale & Hale,
Competition or Control YI: Application of Antitrust Laws to Regulated Industries, 111
U. PA. L. REv. 46 (1962). The authors suggest a "mushroom theory" of economics

whereby "interventionists" (the SEC for example) are said to have the tendency to
naturally expand their coverage over practices in the industry they regulate to such a
degree that eventually there is no room (nor a need) left for the courts to apply antitrust doctrines. Asch, The Antitrust Laws and the Regulated Securities Markets, 11
AN-Iussr BULL. 209 (1966); see Bloom, Securities and Commodities Exchanges, 33 A.B.A.
ANTRnusT L.J. 88 (1967); see also Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604 (1898) (holding

that a live stock exchange could restrict its members from dealing with non-members).
Before the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 exchanges were deemed to have the
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"appeared to be beneficiaries of some sort of antitrust exemption", 3 2
133
provided by the courts. And then along came Silver.
inherent power to enact rules and by-laws. See Cohen v. Thomas, 209 N.Y. 407, 103 N.E.
708 (1913); Members, however, were bound only by rules that were valid. If a rule contravened either the law or public policy, it was held to be invalid. See In re Haebler v. New
York Produce Exch., 149 N.Y. 414, 44 N.E. 87 (1896); Of course, these early cases were decided in a setting which still considered Exchanges "private clubs" (see Belton v. Hatch,
109 N.Y. 593, 17 N.E. 225 (1888)), rather than public institutions, a view more prevalent
today. But see Annot., 54 A.L.R. 304 (1928), for a collection of cases standing for the
proposition that exchanges and boards of trade are affected with a "public interest."
Courts were even more liberal with unincorporated exchanges than with those that
were chartered by the state, on the theory that a chartered organization could not exceed
its grant of corporate power. See Parish v. New York Produce Exch., 169 N.Y. 34, 61 N.E.
977 (1901). If a particular by-law were unreasonable in light of the purposes of the exchange's activity, it was held to be unauthorized. It is evident then that even in the era of
the "private clubs," there existed a legal limitation on the rules promulgated by the exchanges in that rules contrary to laws of the land were held ineffectual and invalid. See
White v. Brownell, 2 Daly 329 (1868). However, one blatant shortcoming of the judicial
treatment of this period before the Exchange Act was the courts' "hands-off" policy concerning the enforcement of the Exchanges rules. The courts generally left the enforcement
of rules up to the Exchanges themselves. See Cohen v. Thomas, 209 N.Y. 407, 103 N.E. 708
(1913).
132 Bloom, supra note 131, at 90.
'33 Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341 (1963); see, e.g., United States v. New York Coffee &
Sugar Exch., 263 U.S. 611 (1924); Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593
(1926); United States v. New England Fish Ech., 258 F. 733 (D. Mass. 1919); Winn
Avenue Warehouse v. Winchester Tobacco Warehouse, 341 F.2d 287 (6th Cir. 1965);
but see United States v. Tarpon Springs Sponge Exch., 142 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1944).
In that case the Exchange was indicted for violating the Sherman Act for conspiring
and concertedly acting to compel fisheries to sell natural sponges only through the
Exchange and for refusing to allow persons purchasing sponges outside of the Exchange the use of its facilities. Although the case concerned itself primarily with a
deficiency in plaintiff's pleadings, the court found that the substance of an antitrust claim
was present. The court stated:
It appears that . . . the defendants have conspired unlawfully to . . . control
.. that supply, and by means of their exchange to control the sale of sponges
and exclude competitors. .. . [To determine the illegality of the exchange]
Em]uch depends upon the purpose with which the exchange is operated and the
intended results to interstate commerce.
Id. at 127-28.
In Silver the NYSE directed a certain number of its members to curtail wire services
they had been providing to non-member over-the-counter securities dealers without giving
the non-members any reason for the discontinuance, nor affording them notice or the
opportunity to be heard. The Exchange had ordered the stoppage pursuant to its own
rules, promulgated under the power of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (rule 355
of NYSE). Petitioners alleged that the Exchange had conspired to deprive them of their
private wire services, in violation of sections 1 & 2 of the Sherman Act. The Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals' decision which had found, in reversing the district
court case, that the Exchange was exempt from the antitrust laws. Initially the Court
noted that absent any federal legislation this action by the Exchange would have
amounted to a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, a clear case of a group
boycott, depriving petitioners to their economic disadvantage. The Court also recognized
that traditionally such concerted refusals had long been held violative of antitrust law.
373 U.S. at 347. See also American Federation of Tobacco Growers Inc. v. Neal, 183 F.2d
869 (4th Cir. 1950). The defendant in that case was an unincorporated tobacco association
operating as a board of trade and controlling the selling of tobacco on the Danville
market, one of the largest tobacco markets in the tobacco belt, and also controlling the
individual warehousemen who were members of the organization. The tobacco produce
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A careful examination of this decision is mandatory since future
litigation, possibly involving NYSE rule 394, will likely be premised
upon the guidelines espoused in this case, to date, the Supreme Court's
only definitive statement encompassing antitrust concepts within the
framework of the securities industry.
Essentially the Silver court determined that Stock Exchanges do
not enjoy absolute immunity from antitrust attack. Moreover, that
broad freedom can only be supported by a showing that such action
is necessary to make the Exchange Act work "and then only to the minimum extent necessary."' 34 The Court elected a reconciliatory approach in an attempt to inject a degree of harmony between the two
apparently conflicting statutory schemes. The difficulty, the Court
noted, lies in the promotion of a realization of the aims of each regimen- antitrust law promoting free competition while the Exchange
13 5
Act contemplating self-government by the Exchanges.
was brought to the board where it was then auctioned. One of the rules adopted by the
board of trade imposed limitations on the number of baskets of tobacco which could be
offered for sale and the number of hours per day sales could take place. The limitation
of time was deemed important since tobacco representatives as the principal buyers
respected this restriction and the auction did not take place unless this limitation was
followed. Plaintiff applied for a membership in the tobacco board but was turned down
on the basis that his warehouse was outside the city limits and as such the association
could not allot selling time to him. The plaintiff failed to function independently because
it was impossible for him to attract buyers to bid at his single warehouse. The net result
was to effectively exclude the plaintiff from the Danville market. The court held that an
unreasonable restraint was clearly demonstrated. The fact that the association controlled
the allotment of selling time enabled the board to stifle its competition by excluding
plaintiff. The court then made the statement that:
[O]ne of the great values of competition is that it encourages those who compete
to reduce costs and lower prices and thus pass on the savings to the public; and
the bane of monopoly is that it perpetuates high costs and uneconomic practice
at the expense of the public.
Id. at 872; accord, Bale v. Glascow Tobacco Bd. of Trade, 223 F. Supp. 739 (W.D. Ky.
1963), aff'd, 339 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1964).
34 373 U.S. at 347.
135 Id. t 349; see also United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
In that case the defendant and other investment banking firms were charged with violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Specifically under attack was the syndicate
system in which the underwriting of securities is accomplished jointly by investment bankers. Judge Medina dismissed the action, failing to find any conspiracy on the part of the
defendants. The court concerned itself in part with the applicability of the antitrust laws
in light of the regulation of the securities industry under the Exchange Acts and SEC
rules. Aiding its decision of dismissal was the material fact that the syndicate form had
been implicitly approved by the rules of the SEC. However, this fact, that the federal regimen approved the joint effort did not, the court felt, preclude the possibility of applying
the antitrust laws. In Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., 250 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. II. 1966), afJ'd, 371
F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 954 (1967) the court faced the issue of legality of
stock exchange practices of fixing commissions for the purchases and sales of securities.
The court held that these practices did not violate the antitrust laws. Kaplan supposedly
clarified Silver by establishing that exchange activity that was dearly within SEC regulation enjoyed immunity from antitrust. Since fixing of rates was within such regulation,
this activity was held not to be violative of the antitrust scheme. However, the validity
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Mr. Justice Goldberg explained that the SEC was not given the
power to curb specific instances of abuse but in the alternative the
exchanges were under a duty to register with the Commission and such
registration could be refused unless the exchanges' rules were "just
and adequate to ensure fair dealing and to protect investors."'31 6
Since the SEC lacked jurisdiction over specific applications of
Exchange rules, "the question of antitrust exemption does not involve any problem of conflict or coextensiveness of coverage with the
agency's regulatory power."'13 7 In addition there is no explicit exemption from the antitrust application in the Securities and Exchange Act
and as a basic rule of construction such repeals by implication are not
favored. 13 The court fortified the result it reached by noting the impotency of the exchange's regulatory scheme especially the absence of
any provisions capable of fostering traditional antitrust goals. 139 However, the Silver court left unresolved the question of the quantum of
substantive justification necessary in an antitrust suit when and if such
a confrontation arises.
Although the Silver decision has been interpreted as merely requiring procedural safeguards, it nevertheless represents the rejection
by the Supreme Court of the idea that exchanges enjoy immunity from
antitrust liability and provides a basis for resolving other anticompetitive charges lodged against the exchanges. The United States Department of Justice has interpreted Silver as clarifying the fact that:
of the Kaplan holding is questionable since the SEC lacks review power for specific enforcement for exchange rules. See criticism to this effect in Thill Sec. Corp. v. NYSE, 433
F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1970).
136 373 U.S. at 352.
137 Id. at 858.
138 Id.; see United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350 (1963)

(citing numerous cases rejecting implied immunity).
139 373 U.S. at 357. Realizing that in a given circumstance the enforcement of exchange rules may very well competitively injure a non-member and that such imposition
may well be outside the goals of the Exchange Act, the Court carefully advised that:
[E]nforcement of exchange rules, particularly those of the New York Stock Exchange with its immense economic power, may well, in given cases, result in
competitive injury to an issuer, a non-member broker-dealer, or another when
the imposition of such injury is not within the scope of the great purposes of the
Securities Exchange Act. Such unjustified self-regulatory activity can only
diminish public respect for and confidence in the integrity mad efficacy of the
exchange mechanism. Some form of review of exchange self-policing whether by
administrative agency or by the courts, is therefore not at all incompatible with
the fulfillment of the aims of the Securities Exchange Act.
Id. at 358.
Furthermore, the Court reasoned, the antitrust laws should serve to fill a serious and
wholly unwarranted void in the securities industry:
[S]ince the antitrust laws serve, among other things, to protect competitive
feedom, i.e., the freedom of individual business units to compete unhindered by
the group action of others, it follows that the antitrust laws are peculiarly
appropriate as a check upon anti-competitive acts of exchanges which conflict
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[T]here is a fundamental antitrust interest in assuring brokerdealers equitable and nondiscriminatory access to the "important
business advantages" which flow from access to NYSE as the
Nation's dominant securities market. Under the Silver case and
other well-established antitrust principles, such access can be
denied only on the ground that the restriction is necessary to make
the Exchange Act work.140
Richard W. McClaren, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
has stated that members of stock exchanges are liable under the antitrust laws for anticompetitive activity in which they engage unless it
can be demonstrated that those practices are legitimate aims of the
14
Securities Exchange Act. '
The question is whether these practices are necessary- and I
stress the word "necessary"- to achieve a legitimate goal of Exchange Act. If they are necessary, then they are legal. If they are
not necessary, then they are subject to the Sherman Act, just like
any other agreement in restraint of trade. The question of necessity is a matter of evidence - not emotion. 42
In United States v. Third National Bank in Nashville,143 the Court explained that exemption from antitrust must be based on genuine
necessity rather than mere convenience and that the statutory scheme

of the Exchange Act which places public responsibilities on the Exchanges, "cannot be satisfied by any particular measure placing more
than the minimum necessary restriction on competition for 'otherwise,

the benefits of competition, acknowledged by Congress, would be
sacrificed needlessly.' "I"
The NYSE position on the matter of immunity conflicts greatly
with their duty to keep their operations and those of their members honest and
viable.
Id. at 359.
140Justice Department's Comments on New York Stock Exchange Proposals to Permit
Member Firms to Go Public, BNA, 25 SEc. REG. L. RPs. X-37 (Nov. 19, 1969).
Even Justice Stewart, who dissented in Silver, and who vehemently criticized the majority
for its misapplication of the antitrust laws to ensure fair procedures are afforded by the
Exchange, recognized situations where Exchange activity would dearly violate the antitrust scheme. Citing the leading cases in the area, he pointed to such illegal activity as
monopolizing or suppressing competition as practices to which antitrust liability would
attach. Silver v. NYSE, 873 U.S. 341, 371 n.5 (1963).
141Antitrust and the Securities Industry: An Address by Richard W. McClaren,
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Before the Investment Banker's Association
of America, Oct. 29, 1969, reprinted in BNA, 23 SEc. REG. L. RaE'. X-4 (Nov. 5,
1969).
142

Id.

143 390 U.S. 171 (1968).
144Justice Department's Comments, supra note 140, at X-38, citing United States v.
Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville, 390 U.S. 171 (1968).

1971]

RULE 394

with the Justice Department's and, in view of several decisions by the
Supreme Court, seems fallacious. 145 By its reasoning the Exchange
would hold all rules which are within the scope of the Exchange's obligation to self-regulate exempt from the antitrust laws as long as these
rules are subject to review under the powers granted to the SEC under
section 19(b) of the 1934 Act. In the Exchange's view, then,
the Commission would have exclusive jurisdiction over any anticompetitive act arguably falling within Section 19(b); and it would
have this jurisdiction regardless of whether it had affirmatively
146
acted with respect to a particular matter.
Such an interpretation is clearly contrary to the basic rule that repeals
of the antitrust laws by implication are not favored. It also conflicts
with the ordinary way the antitrust laws are applied to regulated industries. 147 Insofar as supervision is concerned, the Commission, under
its section 19(b) responsibilities, lacks the inclusiveness illustrated by
the regulatory agencies in the transportation and utilities industries. It
is only in these business sectors that any blanket exemptions from the
antitrust laws has been permitted. 48 Antitrust immunity in these cases
is justified on the grounds that activities which receive the approval of
a regulatory agency must of necessity be free from the infringing
quality of the antitrust laws, lest, "sporadic action by federal courts ...
disrupt an agency's delicate regulatory scheme, and... throw existing
rate structures out of balance."'149 The Justice Department thus favors
the position that every restrictive practice by the Exchange must be
demonstrated to be essential to make the Exchange Act work and that
it is not enough to justify these restrictions solely on the basis that
they fall under the umbrella of the reviewing power of the SEC. 50 It
must also be noted that, viewed from the standpoint of the usual
economic criteria proffered to sanctify such an exemption, there exists
little justification for exempting the securities industry. 15 '
145See

Letter from Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy to the New York Stock

Exchange dated Sept. 8. 1969, cited in Justice Department's Comments, supra note 140, at

X-39.
146 Justice Department's Comments, supra note 140, at X-39.
147 Id.
148 Id.; see 49 U.S.C. § 5 (11), 5(b) (1964) (Railroads and Trucks); 49 U.S.C. §§ 813a,
814 (1964) (Shipping); 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1964) (Airlines), cited id.
149 United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 348 (1959), cited in Justice
Department's Comments, supra note 140, at X-39.
150 Justice Department's Comments, supra note 140, at X-39.
151 See KArsrN & TuRNEaR 189. The authors demonstrate three situations that may
make departure from antitrust policy appropriate. None of the situations seem to represent a legitimate justification for exempting the Exchange from antitrust scrutiny.
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Rule 394 and The Sherman AntitrustAct: Concerted Refusals to Deal 52
One subtle danger inherent in concerted refusals to deal is illus-

trated by an argument which has been passed over with little recognition. Its applicability to the New York Stock Exchange is striking. The

argument proceeds along these lines: as a private governmental body,
the Exchange, or any other collective group, has the ability to institute
its own standards of conduct and correspondingly wields this power to
sanction violations thereof to such an extent that the power approaches
that of a sovereign and is thus inappropriately in the hands of a private
153
organization.

The mere exercise of sovereign-like power, however, is not sufficient to indict such activity. It must also be evident that the combination in question maintains an overwhelming position in the market

in which it carries on its business to make this "private government"
argument more palatable.' 54
Added to the fears generated by the presence of misplaced sovvereign power is the potentiality that private self-governing bodies,
absent effective monitoring by some government body, may tend to

act capriciously an overzealously even in the name of the public interest. 15 The Exchange, favored with a quasi-governmental status, has
152 See Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REv.
847 (1955); Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on Non-Commercial Concerted Refusals to
Deal, 1970 DuxE L.J. 247, 258 [hereinafter Bird]; Burrus & Savarese, Developments in
Antitrust During the Past Year, 38 ANcrrpusT L.J. 323, 340-44 (group boycotts), 458-73
(exemptions from antitrust) (1970). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964); brief for United States
Department of Justice in response to SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8791
(Dec. 31, 1969) In the Matter of Commission Rate Structure of Registered National
Securities Exchanges at 14 ("[r]ule 394 . . .constitute[s] an effective boycott in antitrust

terms.').
153 See Assodated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Fashion Originators
Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States,
175 U.S. 211 (1899). In the Fashion Originators Guild case the Court capsulized the
argument as follows:
In addition to all this, the combination is in reality an extra-governmental
agency, which prescribes rules for the regulation and restraint of interstate commerce, and provides extra-judicial tribunals for determination and punishment
of violations, and thus "trenches upon the power of the national legislature and
violates the statute."
Id. at 465, quoting Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 242 (1899).
154 Bird at 259. The argument is not convincing in a situation where a combination merely establishes standards which are adhered to on a voluntary basis, and have
only insignificant effects on non-members. However, where the combination's market
shares approaches 100% (the NYSE has approximately 80% of the securities trading
market), "or access to the group facility is essential for a business to compete effectively,
it may be accurate to speak of a private government exercising exclusionary powers
which only the sovereign should possess .. " Id.
1551 d. at 260. The author has classified justifications offered for concerted refusals
to deal into the following categories and has analyzed numerous cases under each:
(a) Economic advantage to the combination.
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been granted the authority by Congress to formulate reasonable standards of conduct. However, the critics contend, there are, of necessity,
limitations upon such powers, beyond which any private governmental
body begins encroaching upon the sovereign. At this point, however, the
argument becomes conceptually imprecise -for it is not readily determinable at what point the proper authority has been exceeded.
At the outset, a distinction must be made between the usual commercial boycott and a non-commercial concerted refusal to deal inasmuch as antitrust approaches differ accordingly. 156 The typical group
boycott situation usually has as its primary purpose some form of coercion or exclusion. "The distinguishing feature in group boycott
cases is group action to coerce third parties to conform to the pattern
of conduct desired by the group or to secure their removal from competition."'157 To date, the leading case concerning commercial boycotts
is Klors' Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores Inc.158 In that case plaintiff and
(b) Prevention of arguably unfair or unlawful competitive practices.
(c) Advancement of public policy goals unrelated to the group's immediate material
advantage.
156Whereas a commercial boycott has the sole underlying motivation of profit, a
non-commercial boycott not being primarily concerned with profit per se can be and is
most often motivated by economic factors such as the group's economic self interest.
Id. at 249.
157 Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REv.
847, 875 (1955). See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); TimesPicayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); Stewart Co. v. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Fashion Originators Guild of America v. FTC, 312
US. 457 (1941); Binderup v. Pathe Exch., Inc., 263 US. 291 (1923); Standard Sanitary
Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 US. 20 (1912); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 US. 274 (1908);
Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904). A leading case in this area is Eastern States
Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n. v. United States, 234 US. 600 (1914), which was an action
under the Sherman Act against certain alleged combinations of retail lumber dealers who
conspired as an association to prevent wholesalers from selling directly to consumers.
The association issued reports which required all its retail dealers to apprise the
organization of any wholesaler who sold to consumers. The "guilty wholesaler" was then
in effect blacklisted. The keeping of these lists although the retailers had no express
agreement to do so, resulted in the banning of those wholesalers from trading with
the association. The court held that such activity by these dealers was directly and
unreasonably in restraint of trade in prohibition of the Sherman Act. The Court in an
admonishing tone stated:
When the retailer goes beyond his personal right, and, conspiring and combining
with others of like purpose, seeks to obstruct the free course of interstate trade
and commerce and to unduly suppress competition by placing obnoxious . . .
influence of a condemnatory report circulated among others ..... he exceeds his
lawful rights, and such action brings him and those acting with him within the
condemnation of the act of Congress ...
Id. at 614.
158 359 U.S. 207 (1959); accord, Radiant Burners Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light 8=Coke Co.,
364 U.S. 656 (1961). There a manufacturer of gas burners brought an action claiming
that a gas association conspired to restrain interstate commerce in the manufacture and
sale and use of gas burners in violation of section I of the Sherman Act. The association
included members who were in competition with petitioner. The association it was
alleged, could approve or disapprove new burners and that the criteria it used to judge
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defendant had competing stores dealing in radios, televisions and other
appliances. Klor claimed that the defendant and ten other manufacturers had conspired to restrain and monopolize commerce in violation
of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The plaintiff alleged that it
was equally capable of handling the appliances distributed by the
defendant manufacturers and was likewise as able as the defendant to
offer them for sale. Despite this fact the defendant in conjunction with
the distributors and manufacturers of the appliances conspired not to
sell to the plaintiff or to do so in a discriminatory fashion. 159 The plaintiff also contended that as a result of this refusal to deal it had suffered
great losses of profits, good will and reputation and that its ability to
compete had been severely handicapped. The Supreme Court, reversing the court of appeals, held that the group boycott was one belonging
to a group of restraints 60 which by their very nature were unduly restrictive and thus was illegal per se.
Adversaries of Rule 394 have placed considerable reliance on
Klors in contending that the Rule amounts to an illegal group boycott.
However, it is quite evident from the teachings of Silver that a per se
approach to exchange rules would only be possible absent the existing
federal regulation' 6' in the securities industry and that a better approach is one approximating "a rule of reason" test although the Court
left unanswered exactly what standards would be determinative in
1 62
such a test.

However, where coercion or exclusion are not primary goals of
the concerted action, but rather the economic advancement of the
combination is, the effects on third parties are indirect. One writer
has adduced that:
a new product were arbitrary rather than objective and thus illegally precluded petitioner
from offering his product for sale. Finding for the petitioner, the Court noted that the
tests lacked the necessary objectivity because such testing could be influenced by those
who are in competition with the petitioner. The denial of approval resulted in petitioner's product being eliminated from the market. This prevented the burner from being
purchased even though it was safer and more effident than those already approved by
the association. See Crane Distrib. Co. v. Glenmore Distilleries, 267 F.2d 343 (6th
Cir. 1959); Sunkist Growers Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 284 F.2d 1 (9th
Cir. 1960); Granader v. Public Bank, 281 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Mich. S.D. 1967); Wholesale
Auto Supply Co. v. Hickok Mfg. Co., 221 F. Supp. 935 (D.NJ. 1963).
159 Id. at 209.
160 See Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958), wherein the Court
stated:
However,

there are certain

agreements

or practices which because

of their

pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively
presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as
to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.
161 373 U.S. at 347.
162 Id. at 866.
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The issue in these cases is not the existence or non-existence of a
concerted refusal to deal, but rather whether the purpose and

effect of the operation of the contract, association, exchange or
joint sales agency was such as unreasonably to exclude outsiders

from participation in the trade in question.163

The courts have appreciated the fact that in this area parties may
legally accept limitations on their individual freedom to deal with
others outside the group for the real goals of such concerted action
is to better the business position of the group and not to hinder outsiders directly. However this very foreclosure of a portion of the market
renders such agreements suspect under the antitrust laws. Consider
Associated Press v. United States.1 5 This case concerned a claim that
the By Laws of the Associated Press news gathering association, which
prevented members of the Association from selling news to nonmembers, by definition a concerted refusal to deal, were in violation
of the Sherman Act. As are New York Stock Exchange members, the
A.P. members were bound by the Association's rules under penalty of
suspension or expulsion for their violation. All members under the By
Laws could not sell news to any agency or publisher except to Associated Press.' 6 6 Justice Black noted that the result of these By Laws was
to effectively prevent non-members from gaining the opportunity to
purchase news from Associated Press or its publisher-members. Therefore, membership in the Association was necessary to obtain news or
to buy it from its members.oT The Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's finding that the By Laws were illegal as contracts in restraints
of trade, and that they had seriously hindered competition by preventing the growth of competing newspapers in the newspaper publication
sector.' 68 The majority emphasized the dominant position of Associated
Press in the industry and the effect that the By Laws had on limiting
163 Barber, supra note 152, at 877.
164 Id. at 876-77; see Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933);
Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926); Board of Trade v. United States,
246 U.S. 231 (1918).
165 326 U.S. 1 (1945); see also United States v. Columbia Steel Co. 334 U.S. 495, 522
(1948); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 625, (1953). But see
Florists' Nationwide Tel. Delivery Network v. Florists' Tel. Delivery Ass'n., 371 F.2d 263
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 909 (1967); Evening News Publishing Co. v. Allied Newspaper Carriers, 263 F.2d 715 (3d Cir. 1959); Live Poultry Dealers Protective Ass'n. v.
United States, 4 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1924); see Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n., 358
F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966); Washington State Bowling Proprietors Ass'n. v. Pacific Lanes, Inc.
356 F.2d 371 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 963 (1966); United States v. United States
Trotting Ass'n., TRADE REG. REP. (S.D. Ohio June 29, 1960) (1960 Trade Cas.)
69,761,
at 76,954 (relying on Associated Press).
166 326 U.S. at 9.
167 Id. at 11.
168Id. at 11-12.
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competition by non-members. Justice Black in reaching this decision
relied in part on Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United Stateses
and cited with approval the following passage:
Trade restraints of this character aimed at the destruction of competition tend to block the initiative which brings newcomers into
system, which
a field of business and to frustrate the free enterprise
70
it was the purpose of the Sherman Act to protect.1
"Such hampering of business rivals" the court related, "can only be
attributed to that which really makes it possible - the collective power
of an unlawful combination."'' Nor did the Court accept any offer of
good motive as a justification for such a combination. 172 Ithas been
asserted that as a lawful monopolist, the Exchange, is subject to the
antitrust limitation that those who control a central resource as did
Associated Press, in an industry, the essential resource in the case of the
Stock Exchange being its control over trading facilities in stocks, must
grant access to this resource and make it available on a non-discriminatory basis to all those in the trade. 7 3 The underlying rational for this
principle is to prevent those holding this unique monopoly position
from using the lawful monopoly to destroy competition in related
activities which desirably should remain competitive. 174 The Justice
Department views Associated Press as a clear precedent for the attack
on Rule 394:
If the requirement of non-discriminatory access applies to a
private organization such as Associated Press, it applies even more
forcefully to an institution specifically charged by Congress with
an obligation to serve the public interest. The private dub approach to Exchange membership, where the interests of only existing members are taken into account in formulating Exchange
policy, was banned by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In
reporting the bill which became the Securities Exchange Act, the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce had this
to say on national stock exchanges' obligations to the public
interest:
The bill proceeds on the theory that the exchanges are
public institutions which the public is invited to use for the
purchase and sale of securities listed thereon, and are not
private dubs to be conducted only in accordance with the
interests of their members. The great exchanges of this
169 282 U.S. 30, 42 (1930).
170 326 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1945) (footnote omitted).
171 Id. at 15.
172 Id. at 16 n.15.
173 Justice Department Comments, supra note 140, at X-39.
174 Id.
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country upon which millions of dollars of securities are sold
are affected with a public interest in the same degree as any

other great utility.
The present NYSE members should not be permitted to use
restrictive membership policies to deny their competitors access to
this vital facility (the Exchange floor) or to those other benefits
they enjoy themselves. The Exchange should therefore give careful consideration to the artificial numerical limitation on membership as well as all other specific membership restrictions and
require elimination of those not demanded or required for the
survival of the Exchange market, or the regulatory scheme established under the Securities Exchange Act. 175
It takes little imagination to see the remarkable similarities in Associated and the situation involving rule 394. The third market dealers
closely resemble the non-members in Associated who were denied
access to the news. The market-makers are denied access to the Exchange. While it could be contended that whereas in Associated the
non-members were almost totally unable to compete with the association unless they could obtain the news from that organization, and
that such is not the case in respect to rule 394 since they are able to
compete effectively, this lack of total inhibition of competition is not
fatal to an antitrust claim. ParamountFamous Lasky Corp. v. United
States,'71 makes clear the fact that it is not germane to an antitrust
claim that the victim be able to show that the suspected illegal combination destroys all competition between the parties. 177 "Rather the interest in the public in the preservation of competition is the primary
consideration."'17s Justice Black in Associated also made a similar comment saying that "merely because restraint doesn't inhibit all objects
of the trade, does not save it from condemnation."' 179 Indeed the situation could grow worse for the third market dealers in the event that
a negotiated commission rate is implemented. The competitive advantage for seeking executions off the Exchange would then be diminished. Thus the incentive for going to the third market in the first
place, that is, avoidance of the fixed commissions would be absent.
However, these dealers have demonstrated that they are beneficial to
the industry especially for their ability to take substantial positions in
trades and thus complementing the auction market which may find
some difficulty in absorbing the entire transaction. Given the benefits
175 Id. at X-40; see United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n., 224 U.S. 283 (1912).
176 282 U.S. 30 (1930).
177 Id. at 44.
178 Id.
179 326 U.S. at 17.
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derived, some protection needs to be provided to insure that this alternative market continues to thrive.
In United States v. Columbia Steel Co.,8 0 the Court indicated that
given a concerted refusal to deal with non-members, an association
would be liable per se, regardless of the amount of competition obstructed.'18 However, this approach to voluntary limitations of freedom
has been criticized on the ground that not enough flexibility is afforded
business groups in their activities under this strict rule. 8 2
The voluntary acceptance of limitations on one's own freedom to
deal with others disassociated from a purpose to coerce or exclude
is not necessarily unlawful; if adequate scope is to be given to the
requirements of trade and the productive capabilities of group
activities, the purpose and effect of such a contract or combination
ought to be examined in the context of its operation.... This is
an area where the public interest requires careful regard for the
balancing of competing interests within the framework of the
rule of reason.' 8 3
Moreover, as pointed out earlier, a per se approach is not applicable to
a situation involving the statutory regulation of an industry.
It is worth noting that the Supreme Court has conceded that
there are circumstances where even a dominant group might be justifiably refusing to deal. The Court admitted that:
[The prohibitions of the Sherman Act] do not prevent the
adoption of reasonable means to protect interstate commerce
from destructive or injurious practices and to promote competition upon a sound basis. Voluntary action to end abuses and to
foster fair competitions opportune in the public interest may be
more effective than legal processes. And cooperative endeavor may
appropriately have wider objectives than merely the removal of
evils which are infractions of positive law.' 8 4
* . .

This declaration might provide some basis for justifying the imposition of rule 394. If the threat to the primary auction market is real
and is determined to be of paramount interest vis-A-vis increased competition and lower prices and it is inevitable that the primary market
would be destroyed by the removal of the rule, the Exchange might
be acting in a salutary rather than a destructive manner by insisting
on the rule's application.
180 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948).
181 Id. at 522-23 (dictum).
182 Barber, supra note 152, at 879.
183 Id.
184 Sugar Institute Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 597-98 (1936), cited in Barber,
supra note 152, at 874.
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The approach the Silver court offers is one of reconciliation between the two statutory schemes involved, namely, the antitrust laws
and the Exchange Act. This leads to a determination of whether the
practice or rules is deemed necessary to the proper functioning of the
Exchange under the Securities Exchange Act. If it is not, antitrust
liability may attach. This is nothing more than another form of the
"rule of reason."'1 5 Careful consideration should be given to the oftenquoted passage by Justice Brandeis, in Chicago Board of Trade v.
United States, 88 a case involving the validity of an Exchange rule in
which he set forth a now famous test to determine whether or not
restraints were reasonable:
But the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test as whether it restrains competition.
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test
of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition, or whether it
issuch as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine
that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar
to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the
restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are
all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save
an otherwise objectionable regulation, or the reverse; but because
knowledge of intent may help the court interpret the facts and
to predict consequencess 7
The Board of Trade decision still remains a viable opinion today because of this cogent enumeration of considerations for determining
the reasonableness of a particular restraint. Many of the listed factors
have relevance to rule 394. Moreover,
where the need for self-regulation has been statutorily recognized
and a scheme of federal regulation established which clearly contemplate self-regulation, application of the per se rule would
frustrate this scheme. 88
185 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 211 U.S.
note 102, at 1041.

1 (1911); see also Jaffe, supra

186246 U.S. 231 (1918); accord, Ace Beer Distribs. v. Kohn Inc., 318 F.2d 283
(6th Cir. 1963); Rogers v. Douglas Tobacco Bd. of Trade, 244 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1957);
United States v. General Motors Corp., 234 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Calif. 1964); Parmelee
Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 186 F. Supp. 533 (N.D. Il. 1960).
1871Id. at 238.
188 Bird at 290 (footnote omitted). In Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1
(1958) the Court in referring to the benefits of adopting a per se approach stated:
it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic
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Furthermore, from society's point of view a per se approach may result
in social losses. That is, concerted refusals to deal which would be
upheld by a court utilizing a rule of reason approach and those cases
in which the harms would outweigh the benefits of the per se approach, would nonetheless be struck down under this type of "strict
liability."'1 9 However, mere federal regulation in an industry it is
contended, should not foreclose the applicability of a per se approach.
"[I]t must be clear that the policy of the statute contemplates the exercise of boycotting power to further the statutory purpose."'190
One "rule of reason" approach has been suggested as being applicable to such organizations as the New York Stock Exchange in
determining antitrust liability. Under this approach a joint facility or
exchange when exercising its exclusionary power would have to satisfy
the following requirements in order that it be free from antitrust encroachment: (1) ample notice and an opportunity to be heard would
have to predate the Exchange's use of its boycotting power, (2) the
Exchange's power to exclude would have to be demonstrably germane
to the statutorily recognized need for self-regulation and (3) the stricture must go no further than necessary to achieve the group's valid
self-regulatory goals.' 91 Applying this approach to rule 394 the case
for eradicating the rule grows stronger. While the procedural aspects
of condition (1) could easily be met by the Exchange, the last two conditions would seem, considering the weak justification for the rule
in addition to its discriminatory treatment of non-members to be less
than satisfied.
The Thill Securities Case: A Question of OperationalNecessity.
Since the inauguration of the Securities Exchange Act in 1934,
the NYSE has enjoyed an uncertain antitrust immunity. Never precisely defined, either legislatively or judicially, the Supreme Court
traced the limits of this freedom in its 1963 Silver' 92 decision. In the ininvestigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related
industries, in an effort to determine . . . whether a particular restraint has been
unreasonable ....
Id. at 5.
In the case of the Stock Exchange, however, because of the dash of two statutory
schemes instant dismissal of a restraint under a per se approach is not feasible.
189 Id. at 282.
1901d. at 290.
191 Id. at 292. Consideration should be given to the fact that changes in an industry
may make limitation on access to a joint facility once necessary for the proper functioning
of that industry no longer needed for successful self-regulation. See Memorandum of the
United States Department of Justice on the Fixed Minimum Commission Rate Structure,
In re Commission Rate Structure of Registered National Securities Exchanges, SEC No.
4-144, at 149-52, Jan. 17, 1969, cited in Bird at 291 n.174.
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tervening years there has been a significant absence of Supreme Court
decision on the whole question of Exchange immunity from antitrust
regulation. Indeed, the court has not passed on the merits of any case
since Silver.
It is in this light then that the Seventh Circuit handed down a
landmark decision in Thill Securities Corp. v. New York Stock Exchange.193 Thill, a non-member broker-dealer instituted a treble damage
class action against the exchange, alleging violations of both the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. Specifically, Thill asserted that, through
its rules194 the Exchange prevented its member firms from sharing
commissions with non-member brokers, without regard to the fact
that the non-member might have originated the order. This, Thill
charged, effectively prevented investors from dealing with non-member
firms, and clearly constituted an illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade.
Surprisingly the Exchange elected not to deny the substantive
charges complained of but resolutely determined to stand behind its
assertion that the 1934 Act expressly limited review of exchange practices to the Securities and Exchange Commission and hence, the Federal courts were without jurisdiction to impose antitrust liability. The
district court agreed, ordering judgment summarily in the Exchange's
19
favor. 5
The court of appeals initially discounted the proposition that the
mere fact that Exchange practices were subject to SEC review pro se
gave rise to antitrust immunity. A reconciliation of the two statutory
schemes was eminently preferable argued Judge Campbell, writing
for the court. Perceiving no express exemption in the Securities and
Exchange Act, the court relied on Silver for the proposition that
"[antitrust immunity] is to be implied only if necessary to make the
Exchange Act work, and even then to the minimum extent necessary."'196 Moreover, the court could unearth in the Silver decision "no
intimation that the mere possibility of SEC review wraps the conduct
of the Exchange in an impregnable shield of antitrust immunity", 19 7
as the defendant had urged. To gain this coveted exemption, Judge
Campbell continued, would require of the NYSE a demonstration of
192 Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 841 (1963).

193 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970) [hereinafter Thill]. See Faces Behind the Figures,
FoBrs, Oct. 1, 1970, at 61 for some interesting background to this case.
194 The rule is derived from Art. XV,§ 1 of the Constitution of the NYSE. Thill at
267 n.2.
195 Id. at 268.
1961d., citing Silver v. NYSE, 378 U.S. 341, 357 (19683).
197 Id. at 269.
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genuine necessity.1 8 More precisely, in order for the Exchange to establish necessity, it must show that without the exemption it could
not effectively discharge its responsibility under the Securities and
Exchange Act. 199
Shifting his attention then to the district court's summary disposition of the case Judge Campbell criticized the trial court for its
failure to heed the evidentiary mandate carefully prescribed by the
Supreme Court in Silver. He meticulously noted the absence of evidence in the record, specifically the failure of the trial judge to adduce
the precise extent to which NYSE rules are subjected to examination
by the SEC. Furthermore, he failed to identify any inquiry concerning
why the anti-rebate rule - the very fulcrum of the matter - should
be preserved as necessary for the Exchange to operate. 20 0
Rejecting the Exchange's argument that all judicial investigations
of the possible antitrust implications of NYSE rules must halt upon
demonstrations that such rules were adopted pursuant to its duty of
self regulation (and accordingly subject to SEC review), the court relied
201
on the authority of United States v. Philadelphia National Bank.
Moreover, the court observed that while the SEC might have the power
to consider the antitrust ramifications of Exchange rules, it was nowhere required to do so, and indeed had repeatedly demonstrated a
2 02
pronounced reluctance to do so.
Thill and Beyond
While Thill Securitiesrepresents a judicial adoption of the Justice
Department view, its progeny might be far more significant. Conceivably it might signify a new or more acute awareness on the part of
the federal courts of antitrust violations in the securities industry.
Concurrent with the realization that the courts and not the SEC are
the desired forum for allegations of anti-competitive behavior is the
probability of closer scrutiny of Exchange practices and the likelihood
of a higher standard for judging those rules and practices within the
concept of "operational necessity." Much stricter evidentiary requirements might be forthcoming, although at this date such prognosticating amounts to mere guesswork. In line with this thinking, however,
the Thill court suggested that an offspring of its decision might per198 Id.
299 1d.
200 Id. at 270; see Baum v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 286 F. Supp. 914 (N.D.
]Il. 1968), which similarly interpreted Kaplan as solely concerning a per se violation.
201 Id. at 272, citing 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
202 Id.
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haps be a more widespread involvement of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, together with the Department of Justice, in litigation
involving antitrust claims against the securities exchanges.
In any event, the decision in Ttiill strongly suggests a warning to
the Exchanges, that the courts are going to follow their Congressional
mandate to protect competition and are not going to shun their judicial responsibility to an agency which has proven to be ineffectual
in resolving anti-competitive controversies within the industry.
Hereafter the burden shall be upon the Exchange to offer substantial justification in court for practices which might be considered
anticompetitive. In this realm rule 394 represents a primary illustration, and there appears to be very little which the NYSE might offer
in its defense. At best it is an anachronistic holdover, at worst a premeditated, last ditch effort to maintain a rapidly perishing monopoly.
In the face of a judicial examination, with the paramount concern
that of protecting the public investor, there appears little doubt over
the fate of such restrictions.
THE COMPETTIVE MAR UP OF THE SECURrlS INDUSTRY:

AN SEC ASSESSMENT
Since 1934 the competitive policies of the NYSE have, broadly
speaking, remained constant, while the social and technological environment in which the Exchange exists has undergone almost continuous upheaval. 20 3 The SEC's Special Study has anticipated the cumulative impact of this process on the daily stock exchange activities
and suggests that certain structural reforms should be accompanied by
modification of key rules and practices. Furthermore, the study recommends that these rules should be subject to periodic review to ensure
that they are utilized to effect changes which "might be in the interest
of the public." 20 4 Surveying the probable effects on the industry of such
contemporary developments as the increasing importance of the O-T-C
market, the proliferation of institutional investors and the rise of the
third market, the Study urged that immediate consideration be given
by the Exchange toward reform of outdated methods and practices,
2 05
particularly the fixed commission system.
203 See, e.g., SPECIAL STUDY 952.
204 Id.

205 Id. 953-54. Recently the Commission rejected NYSE proposals to continue
and raise its fixed commission fee system. The Commission's repudiation was based
primarily on its desire to see negotiated rates implemented on sales aggregating over
$100.000.
The Commission reached the conclusion that fixed commission rates on large orders
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Recognizing that the presence of multiple securities markets
would produce competitive incentives and, hence, more optimal economic conditions in each marketplace, the commission emphasized
that the extent of governmental regulations of the securities industry
2 06
would ultimately depend upon the existence of effective competition.
Moreover, concerning the depth of the market the Study discounts the
argument that the primary auction market might have to sacrifice
some depth since the overall effect of multiple markets would be ben20
eficial to the public investor.

7

The fundamental policy of the securities industry, the Commission recommended, should remain unchanged. Theoretically at least,
that policy had been since 1934 a policy designed to stimulate free and
open competition and this presumably included the prevention of
unfair and anti-competitive practices. The Commission underscored
the fact that such a policy is in the public interest, but cautioned that
effective implementation would demand a continuing awareness of
changing circumstances and emerging problems. 20 8 Thus in a modern
economy, restricted access to the exchange machinery no longer appears
justifiable. Indeed, all indicia would seem to demonstrate that the
concepts of the favored marketplace is neither socially nor economically
tenable today.
Recently, a third market dealer, addressing the National Investor
Relations Institute, cautioned that the Exchange must submit to more
competitive practices if it is to remain a dominant force in the induswere unnecessary in light of the fact that members had eluded the onus of these fees
through various arrangements between themselves and customers.
The proposed modification of the commission rate system to allow for negotiations
was prompted especially for this reason. An illustrative method which was used to
circumvent the fee system was the customer-directed give up. In this transaction, the
broker on the Exchange was "directed" by a customer to keep only a part of the total
commission, paying the balance to a customer-designated broker who had performed
other related services for the client. While the directed give up was banned in 1968, the
situation has changed little. The interim volume discount on large orders did not even
avoid further manipulation of commission rates. New plans were implemented whereby
brokers performed reciprocal services for customers, in return for a customer's payment.
Examples of this reciprocity were: a broker paying for the maintenance of a phone in a
customer's car; the broker doing his banking business with a concern who bought its
stocks from him. All this points to the fact that the Exchange has been operating with a
de facto system of negotiated rates, under the guise of the fixed system. See The Wall
Street Journal, Oct. 29, 1970, at 10, col. 4.
As of April 1, 1971 the SEC has ordered the Exchange to do away with fixed rates
on large institutional transactions. The Exchange has been given the flexibility to determine at what amount competitive rates will begin with a ceiling of $500,000 being imposed; i.e., any sales of $500,000 or over must be charged a competitive rate. Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 9079 (Feb. 11, 1971). See also note 4 supra.
206 SpEcUL STUDy 957.
207 Id.
208 Id. 957-59.
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° In addition, both government figures and economic experts alike
try209
have opted in favor of increased competition in the securities industry.
Former Assistant Attorney General Donald F. Turner has warned that
the effect of competitive inertia in the Securities industry is increased
costs and poorer service, even with regulations.

[Wqhere there is regulation and no competition, firms may become
lazy, for they may feel that they are, in effect, guaranteed a profit.
On the other hand, if regulated firms also face some competition,
they may work harder to keep costs down, to improve the quality
of their service,
or to devote sufficient resources to research and
innovation. 210
Similarly, the Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul A. Samuelson has
expressed the viewpoint that
[t]he Securities markets are one live, interconnected whole and the
important thing is that there be freedom for equitable and sufficient competitive forces to operate throughout that network and
not that we protect volume or appearances
on one particular
domicile of the securities business. 211
Professor Henry C. Wallich testified that with sufficient communication links there might well be a market with more than one physical
location 212 and supporting this statement was Professor William Baumol
who disclosed at the SEC hearings that the existence of one single
213
market is not critical in view of the current state of electronics.
Professor Demsetz testified to the absence of any coercive arrangements in the over-the-counter market like those found on the exchanges. The market forces, he related, serve in the absence of this coercion "channelling transactions to the particular specialist in the
over-the-counter market precisely because these specialists can offer
the services of making the market more cheaply than could 10 or 20
specialists." 214 The witness identified the economic phenomenon working in the over-the-counter market as being a "natural gravitation of
2 15
transactions to particular specialists in the over-the-counter market.
To gain the benefits of economies, he explained he did not favor or
209 BNA, 76 SEC. RE. L. RE. A-4 (Nov. 11, 1970).
210 Statement of Assistant Attorney General Donald F. Turner before the Senate
Commerce Committee on S. 3186, July 18, 1966, at 8, cited in Hearings, Jan. 22, 1969,
at 4475. Dr. Turner directed the operations of the Justice Department's antitrust division.
211 Hearings 8540-41, 3550-53.
212 Id. 3801, cited id., Jan. 22, 1969, at 4489.
213 Id. 3645-44, cited id., Jan. 22, 1969, at 4489.
214 Id.,
215 Id.

Jan. 22, 1969, at 4488, citing Pacific Coast Stock Exch. echibit 4, at 20.
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think it desirable to coerce members to bring their transactions there.216
"Whenever you introduce that coercion, you do frustrate the develop' 217
ment of avenues of competition that we have not yet thought of.
As to the specialist on the Exchange, one third market dealer noted the
monopoly position enjoyed by that trader and pointed to still another
discriminatory practice since brokers who are members are not prevented from by-passing the specialist and seeking bids or offers directly
from other members. He failed to see why some members could not
effectively seek third market makers too.2 18
All of the above statements certainly deserve close attention in
respect to rule 394. The New York Stock Exchange must awaken soon
to the realities of the situation if it is to remain the bulwark of the
securities industry.219 The Justice Department found that the evidence
adduced at the SEC hearings did not establish the need for restraints
such as 394 and 394(b) to preserve the central market. In fact, the
central market, it related, would continue to thrive without the force
220
of these restrictive practices.
CONCLUSION

The testimony elicited at the SEC hearings, attests to the fact that
rule 394 is demonstrably discriminatory in its applicability to members
of the NYSE. Additionally, there are the observed inequities of the
rule's operation which, in effect, unreasonably preclude non-member
dealers in the third market from gaining access to the "resource" which
the Exchange as a lawful monopolist holds or should hold in "trust"
for the benefit of the entire industry. Indeed, Congress has expressly
216Id., May 2, 1969, at 3861.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 See United States Department of Justice Brief in response to SEC Release No.
8971, Dec. 31, 1969, re Investigation of the Commission Rate Structure of National
Securities Exchanges, at 2.
One might consider as a final thought on competition this exegesis by the Supreme
Court in Northern Fac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1957), delineating the
purposes of the antitrust regimen:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.
It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces
will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the
highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and
social institutions. But even were that premise open to question, the policy
unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.
556 U.S. at 4. See also KAYSEN &cTURNEt 44, wherein the authors see the policy of
antitrust laws as being the limitation of undue market power. They suggest amending
the antitrust laws to enable an attack on undue market power even absent any conspiracy in the legal sense.
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declared a policy of promoting competition within the securities industry, reasoning that the ultimate effect of such a policy is to enhance
the position of the public investor, an end certainly within the scope
of the 1934 Act. These factors weigh heavily against the continued
vitality of the rule. There seems to be little justification for the hampering of business rivals by the Exchange under the rule especially since
the evidence does not tend to support the imposition of such a restriction as a necessary cog in the machinery of self-regulation. The restriction simply does not appear to be germane to legitimate self-regulation goals. It amounts to a clear suppression of competition in the
securities markets. While the Securities Exchange Act quite agreeably
mandates self-regulation, it by no means dictates that this duty be
exercised at the expense of competitors no matter what the cost to
221
these rival firms and the public at large.
It is submitted that a better view is to deem the exchanges, rather
than having an unqualified duty to self-regulate at any social cost, to
have the duty to do so without substantially destroying competition,
especially when such stifling is superfluous to the statutory scheme governing the securities industry. It is further submitted that this viewpoint
is fully consistent with the mandates of the Securities Exchange Act.
The one question left then is: What body is to adjudicate competitive abuses by the Exchange? Both Silver and now the recent Thill
case strongly suggest that the most efficacious machinery is to be found
in the antitrust laws and the judiciary. The Justice Department has
indicated that there are certain attributes to be derived from a judicial
approach:
Our own view is that antitrust serves as preferable alternative
221Indeed, despite the existence of the self-regulation mechanism in the securities

industry, it is evident that some form of government oversight is necessary "to insure
that action in the name of self-regulation is neither discriminatory nor capricious." Cary,
Self Regulation in the Securities Industry, 49 A.B.AJ. 244, 246 (1963). At the root of this
need for oversight is an obvious though scarcely emphasized concept of the profit motive.
Quite properly, the profit motive is at the root of our economic system. But given
this motive, regulation of the industry in the interest of the public cannot be
left exclusively to the practitioners (exchanges) public spirited though they be.

Id. at 244.
Since the Commission has not, to date, demonstrated a "take charge" attitude in grappling
with industry practices alleged to be anticompetitive, possibly the Justice Department

could provide the necessary policing through its enforcement of the antitrust laws in
the courts. The Court in Silver was aware of the lack of effective oversight by the SEC
stating:
Without the oversight of the Commission to elaborate from time to time on
the propriety of various acts of self-regulation, the Exchange is left without
guidance and without warning as to what regulative action would be viewed as
excessive by an antitrust court ....
Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 360 (1963).
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to ever-increasing government regulation. The American public
long ago determined that if the free market did not function well
as an economic regulator, government must do the regulating. Our
job as antitrust enforcers is to keep the free market mechanism
functioning so that government regulation will be held to an
absolute minimum. The drama now being played out before the
SEC presents the rather curious spectacle of a government agency
in this case, the Department of Justice - arguing for free
market competition, and private business - in this case the stock
exchanges - battling in effect for government price regulation.
As a firm believer in competition, I strongly suspect that if the
222
exchanges win the battle, they may lose the war.
One might add, in favoring this approach, an often-stated reason for
contrarily holding that the regulatory agency is more qualified to deal
with the particular industry they oversee, as a justification for applying
antitrust laws through the courts! The argument, of course, is the
"agency expertise" rationale. It is beyond debate as to who possesses
the expertise in antitrust matters. The courts, having been congressionally chosen as the depository of this protective scheme, will serve
the securities industry well in maintaining the competitive atmosphere
necessary to achieve the proper allocation of resources within the securities market.
222 Justice Department Comments, supra note 140, at X-40.

